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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This is an appeal from the "Final Agency Action and Order on 
Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991, in Case No. 
91-067-01 and the "Response to Request for Reconsideration" of 
the Utah Department of Health Care Financing, Rod Betit, 
Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01, and from the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the agency's order. 
Allen v. Utah Depyt of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin., 829 P.2d 
122 (Utah App. 1992). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1987), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 and 
78-2a-4 (1992). (This is an appeal of an administrative agency 
order having the priority of argument designated under Rule 
29(b)(14) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing ("Department"), erred in finding that Appellant 
could not "spend down" his assets to become eligible for Medicaid 
and whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming this ruling? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is whether, on the basis of the 
agency's record, the Appellant has been substantially prejudiced 
by the agency's action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989); 
The correction-of-error standard of judicial review applies to 
1 
agency decisions involving issues of law and no deference is 
extended to agency rulings. Agency findings of fact are accorded 
substantial deference and will not be overturned, if they are 
based on substantial evidence. Hurley v. Industrial Commission, 
767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 C.F.R. § 435.840 (1990). 
42 C.F.R. § 435.841 (1990). 
42 U.S.C. § 1382b(2)(A) (1992) 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(c) (L992). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r) (1992). 
(See Addendum for copies of these provisions.) 
STATEMENT' OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a denial of Medicaid assistance dated 
February 19, 1991. Record, at 113 (hereinafter "R"). A 
prehearing conference was held on March 12, 1991. R. 108. A 
hearing was held on April 3, 1991. R. 97. Appellant, Doyce 
Allen (hereinafter "Allen") appeared in person and was not 
represented by counsel at his administrative hearing. R. 97. 
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Course of the Proceedings 
On April 29, 1991, Allen, received an unfavorable "Final 
Agency Action and Order on Review," which found that Allen was 
over the asset limit for Medicaid coverage. R. 94-106. A 
"Response to Request for Reconsideration," dated June 6, 1991, 
upheld this decision. R. 78-80. 
Disposition at Agency and Court of Appeals 
Medicaid assistance having been denied at the agency level, 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals followed. R. 88-91. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the agency. 
Relevant Facts with Citations to the Record 
Allen was 64 years old at the time of the hearing. R. 7, 
98. He was ineligible for Medicare because he was not 65 years 
of age. R. 9-10. He suffered a heart attack on January 23, 
1991. R. 5. 
Allen had worked for years at Intermountain Farmers and had 
been covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance. R. 98. 
After retirement Allen continued to receive this insurance 
coverage for eighteen months under "COBRA".1 R. 34, 36. As the 
end of his period of COBRA coverage approached, Allen worked 
part-time at Intermountain Farmers to save up enough money to pay 
the necessary premiums to maintain his Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
insurance coverage beyond the COBRA period. R. 33-37. 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
which allows continuing private insurance coverage. 
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He filed an application for insurance with Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield. R. 33, 124-28. It is apparent from the fact that Allen 
saved this particular amount (i.e., the amount necessary to pay 
his insurance premium until he would be eligible for Medicare) 
and from the correspondence which accompanied his application 
that he fully expected to be given this continued coverage. See 
R. 33, 36, 37, 124. However, his application was denied on 
account of previous heart surgery. R. 5, 6, 33-34. 
Allen appealed his denial but only succeeded in obtaining 
the names of additional insurance companies. R. 37. Allem 
contacted these companies but considered the price of any other 
insurance to be prohibitive. R. 37. It was apparent that the 
amount of money he had saved would not provide coverage for the 
desired period because of the high monthly premiums. See R. 33, 
37. It also appeared that these other insurance company may have 
denied coverage regardless of the amount of the premium he would 
have been willing to pay. R. 98. 
Allen went without coverage for approximately six months and 
was less than a year from his sixty-fifth birthday (when he would 
have become eligible for Medicare) at the time of his heart 
attack. See R. 5, 37, 101. He applied for Medicaid benefits on 
February 4, 1991. R. 11, 98. 
Allen's Medicaid application included a request for 
retroactive benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately 
$40,000.00 in medical bills resulting from his heart attack. R. 
11-13, 98. By the time he was admitted to Utah Valley Regional 
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Medical Center for open-heart surgery, Allen was already 
obligated for $4,997.55 to Air Evac for air ambulance services 
rendered on January 26, 1991, in Phoenix, Arizona; $554.00 to Dr. 
Nudelman for critical care given on January 23-26, 1991; and, 
$9,649.10 to Havasu Samaritan Regional Hospital for 
hospitalization from January 23-26, 1991. R. 133-37, 140. 
Thereafter he incurred medical bills in the amounts of $304.50 to 
Valley Ambulance, Inc. for life flight on January 26, 1991; 
$1,495.00 to Dr. Frischknecht for hospital treatment from January 
26-February 1, 1991; $1,872.00 for the anesthesiologist; 
$5,025.00 to Dr. Smith for treatment on January 27, 1991; 
$23,626.58 to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for 
hospitalization from January 26, 1991 to February 1, 1991. R. 
138-39, 141-44. 
In order to qualify for Medicaid, Allen and his wife could 
not have assets in excess of $3,000.00. A review of their assets 
by the Medicaid office found that Allen and his wife held 
$3,029.00 in a savings account and $100.00 in a checking account 
as of the first moment of each of the months of January and 
February, 1991. R. 98. It was also found that Allen owned a 
1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately $2,500.00, which 
could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile and a 
$7,000.00 1981 travel trailer. R. 98.2 
2Allen's wife Lilly, age 62, is currently on Social Security 
Disability and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis, 
as well as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a 
medical necessity. R. 6, 98, 114-23. When Mrs. Allen received 
her award certificate from the Social Security Administration, 
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Allen was denied Medicaid by the Office of Family Support, 
since his assets totaled $10,745-90. R. 113. Following a fair 
hearing, the Department affirmed the decision of the Office of 
Family Support, finding that Allen's savings account exceeded the 
limit. R. 99. The value ascribed to Allen's motor vehicles and 
travel trailer were not considered necessary to sustain a denial. 
R. 99.3 However, it was argued and left undecided whether the 
truck and travel trailer could be excluded as medical necessities 
for Allen's wife. R. 52-59, 67-68, 98. 
An issue was also raised as to whether the savings account 
fund was being held for burial expenses. R. 68-69. In Allen's 
will he had specifically listed the savings account as being for 
burial expenses. R. 82. 
An additional issue was raised that Allen should have been 
allowed to "spend down" his assets in order to qualify for 
Medicaid. R. 130. At the hearing it was found that a spend down 
is only permitted with regard to income, not assets. R. 16-19. 
He also incurred many medical bills in January prior to his 
surgery, which he could have spent down to become eligible for 
Medicaid in February. R. 135-38, 140-44. 
for $7,844.00, she used it to purchase the travel trailer to 
travel to more suitable climates during the winter. R. 7-9, 114. 
3
. It appears that there is no "scope of service" problem 
and that Appellant's open-heart surgery would be paid for by 
Medicaid, if he were found eligible. R. 22. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Allen should have been permitted to spend down his assets so 
as to be eligible for medicaid. A resource spend down is 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the medicaid program. 
Allowance of a 90-day retroactive application shows congressional 
intent to include a resource spend down. Federal law requires 
state medicaid plans to include reasonable standards and failure 
to include a resource spend down violates this requirement. An 
income spend down implies the adoption of a resource spend down. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
AND THE PRESIDING OFFICER FAILED TO DECIDE ALL OF THE 
ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION—I.E., PETITIONER SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO SPEND DOWN HIS ASSETS SO AS TO 
QUALIFY FOR A MEDICAID CARD. 
A. Overview of the Medicaid Program 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program designed to meet 
some of the medical needs of low-income persons. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 et seg. (1992); Schweiker v. Hocran, 457 U.S. 569, 571, 73 
L.Ed 2d 227, 102 S.Ct. 2597, (1982). States are not 
required to participate in the Medicaid program; however, once 
they choose to do so, they must comply with the Medicaid statute 
and implementing regulations. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,, 453 
U.S. 34, 37, 69 L.Ed 2d 460, , 101 S.Ct. 2633, (1981). A 
state participating in Medicaid must designate the state cigency 
responsible for administering its program and must file a state 
plan with the federal agency stating, among other things, the 
coverage it intends to provide,, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992). 
The respondent in this case is the designated Utah Medicaid 
agency. 
Eligibility for Medicaid is divided into two categories: 
categorically needy and the medically needy. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a 
(a)(10)(A) (i) & (ii) (1992). Those persons receiving 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Aid to Families with 
Dependent children (AFDC) are considered categorically needy and 
the statute mandates that they receive Medicaid coverage. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 a(a)(10) (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 436.100 (1990). Under 
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the medically needy program, persons who would be considered 
disabled for SSI purposes but who have income and resources 
exceeding an established standard are permitted to incur bills 
which bring them within the set limits for eligibility. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 435.301 (1990). In 
determining Medicaid eligibility for a disabled person, a state 
participating in Medicaid must apply resource eligibility 
criteria which are no more restrictive than those applied in the 
SSI program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 a(a)(10)(C)(III) (1992); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(r) (1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.301(a)(2), 435.840 & 435.841 
(1990). In this case, the SSI resource criteria found at 20 
C.F.R. §§ 416.1216 & 416.1218 (1990) are directly applicable. 
See addendum. 
Utah has opted to participate in the Medicaid Program and 
has established the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF) to 
implement, organize, administer and maintain the program. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 26-18-2.1, 26-18-3 (1989 & Supp. 1991). As a 
condition for receipt of Medicaid funds, Utah submitted a State 
plan for the medical assistance program and agreed to administer 
the program in accordance with the provisions of the State plan, 
the requirements of Titles XI and XIX of the Social Security Act, 
and all applicable Federal regulations and other official 
issuances of the Department. Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-1 
(1991). As part of its plan, Utah adopted a medically needy 
program. Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-17 (1991). Utah has 
promulgated some of its resource criteria in the Utah 
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Administrative Code § R810-304 (1991). A more complete and 
current version is published in Volume III of Utah's policies and 
procedures. The asset level for two persons applicable in this 
case is $3000.00. Utah Administrative Code § R810-304-403 
(1991). 
At the Court of Appeals, Allen argued that the Utah 
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("the 
Department"), erred in counting his savings account as an 
available asset. That issue was decided against him by the Court 
of Appeals and is not before this Court. However, the Department 
further erred in finding that Allen could not spend down his 
assets to become eligible for Medicaid. This is the sole issue 
before the Court. 
B. DHCF was Required to Implement a Resource Spend Down in Order 
to Fulfill the Purpose of the Medicaid Program 
The "spend down" concept is an integral part of a medically 
needy program. The federal statute, in setting out the 
requirements of an acceptable state plan provides, in part: 
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must 
.... 
(17) ... include reasonable standards ... for 
determining eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with 
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for 
taking into account only such income and resources as 
are ... available to the applicant or recipient... (C) 
provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or 
resources, and (D) ... provide for flexibility in this 
application of such standards with respect to income by 
taking into account ... the costs ... incurred for 
10 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992). 
Under subsection (17)(D), an income spend down must be 
applied. The argument for a resource spend down is based on the 
purpose of a medically needy program, which is to provide needed 
care to individuals while exempting certain asset levels. 
There is no dispute between the parties that the purpose of 
the Medicaid program is to provide for the medical needs of those 
lacking the means to provide their own care. Thus, the Medicaid 
statute provides that its purpose is "to furnish....medical 
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of 
aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources 
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services..." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). By refusing to implement a 
resource spenddown in this case, DHCF defeats that purpose. 
The parties are in agreement that a resource spenddown is 
permitted under the Medicaid statute but do not agree whether it 
is required in order to carry out the purpose of the Medically 
needy program. A number of courts that have considered this 
issue have concluded that a resource spend down is a necessary 
part of a medically needy program. In Haley v. Commissioner of 
Public Welfare. 476 N.E. 2d 572, 579 (Mass. 1985), the court 
concluded that a resource spend down was intended, since the 
legislature had provided that "up to $2000 of personal property" 
was exempt. The court concluded: 
11 
The Department's policy of determining 
eligibility without the application of a 
resource spend down does not comply with the 
requirement that an individual be allowed to 
retain a certain level of resources. Id. 
In Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, 544 N.E. 2d 751, 757-
58 (111. 1989), similar reasoning was applied. The court noted 
that Illinois had chosen to provide medically needy coverage and 
had exempted "at least $1500 in assets when determining Medicaid 
eligibility." Because of this expressed intent to preserve a 
certain level of assets for medically needy individuals, the 
court found that a failure to apply a resource spend down would 
defeat legislative intent. Finally, in Kempson v. North Carolina 
Dept. of Human Resources, 397 S.E. 2d 314, 318 (N.C. App. 1990), 
aff'd (by equally divided courtK 403 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. 1991), use 
of a resource spend down was found to be required in order to 
carry out the purpose of North Carolina's medically needy 
program. Again, this conclusion was based on the fact that a 
medically needy program by definition protects a certain level of 
assets for persons who cannot afford their own medical care. See 
Westmiller by Hubbard v. Sullivan, 729 F.Supp. 260 (W.D. N.Y. 
1990); Contra, Harrison v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me 1991). 
The Utah Court of Appeals majority panel mistakenly read 
these cases as requiring a "specific legislative directive" in 
order for a resource spend down to be applied.4 Its attempt to 
4
 The Court of Appeals reads footnote 9 of Haley v. 
Commissioner far too broadly in concluding that the Illinois 
court "found a statute "explicitlyf appl[ying] a resource spend 
down..." The Illinois statute concerned transfer of assets cases 
which are a less common category of cases. While suggestive of 
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resolve the issue by looking to the Utah Medical Assistance Act, 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-18-1 et. seq. (1989), to determine 
whether the Utah legislature had "adopted" a resource spend down 
was misguided. Such a focus is inappropriate and guaranteed to 
produce a fruitless result, since the Utah legislature, in 
enacting the Medical Assistance Act, was silent on the issue. 
Not only did the legislature not address resource spend down, it 
makes no mention of the medically needy program at all. The 
Court of Appeals majority panel's focusing on what it 
characterized as "a legislative concern for economy and 
efficiency in the Medicaid program" (Utah Code Annotated § 26-18-
2.3(1) (1989) is misleading, since it bears no relationship to 
the specific question at issue. The general statement regarding 
the need for economy in administering the Medicaid program could 
apply to any aspect of the program and does not evidence any 
intent to preclude use of a resource spend down. 
Rather than mentioning the medically needy program, the 
Medical Assistance Act simply creates the DHCF and delegates to 
it authority for carrying out the Medicaid program. Utah Code 
Annotated § 26-18-2.1 (1989). It is DHCF that then decides which 
optional programs it wishes to provide in the state of Utah. 
DHCF's discretion is not absolute, however, since the Utah 
legislature must annually budget the amount of state dollars to 
the need for a resource spend down, the Illinois statute did not 
expressly authorize this mechanism in all cases as the Court of 
Appeals seems to conclude. 
13 
be allocated to the Medicaid program. Should the Utah 
legislature wish to restrict the Medicaid program, it could 
refuse to allocate funds to optional programs such as medically 
needy. The legislature has approved of the medically needy 
program in recent years, despite increasing demands on the 
Medicaid budget. By continuing to fund the medically needy 
program, the Utah Legislature has unequivocally expressed its 
support of the purpose of the program: to provide medical care 
to needy individuals while allowing them to preserve a certain 
level of personal property. 
It is DHCF which implements the medically needy program and 
expresses in published regulations the Federal requirement that 
certain assets are exempt. Utah Adm. Code § R810-304-411 (1991). 
Included in the exempt assets are the applicant's home, a burial 
space, a $1500.00 burial fund and up to $3000.00 in personal 
property for a couple such as the Aliens. Implicit in the 
approval of the medically needy program by the Utah legislature 
is a statement that low income Utah citizens in need of medical 
care must be allowed to preserve at least these minimum asset 
levels. If the purpose of the medically needy program is to be 
carried out, a resource spenddown must be allowed. 
C. The Allowing Of A 90-Day Retroactive Application Shows 
Congressional Intent to Include* a Resource Spend Down 
Congressional intent to include a resource spend down in the 
Medicaid Act is also found in the provision allowing retroactive 
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application to establish eligibility for the three months before 
the month of application. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992); Utah 
Administrative Code § 455-1-11 (1991). By this provision, 
Congress intended to make medical assistance available to 
applicants who were unable to apply at the time they became ill, 
due to the severity of their illness or because of other factors. 
Those potentially eligible for medically needy coverage but who 
are unaware of the restriction on resource spend down, or who are 
unable to spend down in time, are denied coverage. As the court 
in Kempson, 397 S.E. 2d at 318 observed, "Medicaid applicants are 
blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply because it is 
so illogical." It is consistent with congressional intent to 
allow an applicant both the right and some time to spend down 
excess assets so as to become eligible for medical assistance. 
If Allen had been informed of the spend down requirements 
before applying for Medicaid, he could have spent down his excess 
assets, prior to application, thereby making himself eligible for 
medical assistance. He was already obligated for over $15,000 of 
medical bills (far in excess of his non-exempt assets) by the 
time he arrived in Utah for open-heart surgery. R. 133-37, 140. 
However, in the present case, Allen was in no physical condition 
to spend down his assets prior to his release from the hospital, 
just as he was in no condition to apply for Medicaid prior to 
that time. The only fair way of resolving Allen's dilemma was to 
allow a retroactive spend down of his excess resources. 
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D. Federal Law Requires State Medicaid Plans to Include 
Reasonable Standards 
Federal law requires state medicaid plans to "include 
reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and 
the extent of medical assistance under the plan which are 
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 
et seq. (1992)]." 42 U.S.C- § 1396a(a)(17) (1992). A standard 
for determining eligibility is not reasonable unless it includes 
the opportunity to offset excess resources against incurred 
medical expenses. See Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 2019 
(states are not allowed to require the use of income or resources 
which would bring the individual's income below the amount set as 
the test of eligibility under the state plan because this would 
reduce the person below the level determined by the state as 
necessary for his maintenance). A person who is unable actually 
to spend down his assets would become liable to the full extent 
of his resources, including resources which Congress intended to 
be retained by the applicant. 
In Haley the court said: 
The department's policy of determining eligibility 
without the application of a resource spend down does 
not comply with the requirement that an individual be 
allowed to retain a certain level of resources. 
Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 579. See also Walter 0. Boswell Hospital, 
Inc. v. Yavapai County, 714 P.2d 878, 881 (Ariz. 1986) (a case 
concerning a county health program, where the court analogized to 
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Medicaid law, interpreting the Medicaid Act under Haley as 
requiring a resource spend down in order to comply with the 
requirement that an individual be allowed to retain a reasonable 
level of both resources and income). 
The Illinois Supreme Court, reached the same result in 
Hession; 
By failing to consider an individual's incurred 
medical expenses as well as his or her assets, the 
Department defeats the legislature's intent. Under the 
Department's policy, a Medicaid applicant possessing 
resources in excess of the asset disregard is found to 
be ineligible for medical assistance despite the fact 
that the applicant may have incurred medical expenses 
which far exceed his or her resources. Because the 
applicant is not eligible for assistance, he or she 
becomes personally responsible for paying these bills 
and is required to deplete the assets which the 
legislature intended to be disregarded. 
In contrast, by allowing an applicant to spend 
down the assets above the disregard with incurred 
medical expenses the applicant is entitled to Medicaid 
benefits once the medical expenses exceed the excess in 
assets. Thus an individual is allowed to retain a 
certain level of assets and is personally liable for 
his or her medical expenses only to the extent that his 
or her resources exceed permissible limits. 
Considering the legislature's intent that the medically 
needy be allowed to retain some of their assets, we 
conclude that the Department must employ resource spend 
down methodology when determining Medicaid eligibility 
for these individuals. 
Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 758. 
The Medicaid Act also requires a "reasonable evaluation" of 
resources for purposes of eligibility for medical assistance. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(C) (1992). "[Reasonable evaluation" means 
that "the States will not . . . overvaluate income and resources 
which are available." Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
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reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 2018. 
Allen's medical expenses far exceed his resources. Failure to 
consider his excess medical expenses against his resources 
overvalues his resources and is unreasonable. 
As stated in the dissenting opinion by Judge Bench, a policy 
not to allow a resource spend down, is unreasonable "since 
eligibility is determined by when the medically needy applicant 
applies for benefits." Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, 829 P.2d 
122, 128-29 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, J., dissenting). An 
applicant who is "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets 
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the 
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not 
eligible." Id. at 129. Therefore a resource spend down should 
be allowed before eligibility is determined. Id. 
E. An Income Spend Down Implies the Adoption of a Resource Spend 
Down 
A resource spend down is .Impliedly adopted in the existence 
of an income spend down. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1992) 
(income spend down recognized); Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, 
829 P.2d 122, 125 n.9 (Utah App. 1992) (cases recognizing an 
income spend down). This is because resources are merely income 
which continues to be "held on the first moment of a calendar 
month." Utah Administrative Code § 810-304-403.12 (1991)., In 
other words, money which was income on December 31st becomes an 
asset the next day, on January 1st, if it is not spent prior to 
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that time. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1992), such money 
would be eligible for a spend down on December 31st, as income. 
It is unreasonable to think that Congress intended the mere 
passage of time to make such money ineligible for a spend down. 
It is logical to assume that Congress intended an income spend 
down to cover "saved income" as well as current income. 
Otherwise people will be motivated not to save and not to invest 
their saved income in assets which, if they exceed the exempt 
assets, could arguably be used to decrease the government's 
burden of providing part of their health care. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the decision of the Department and 
Court of Appeals. The case should be remanded for a finding that 
a resource spend down applies and that Allen should have been 
allowed to spend down his assets so as to become eligible for 
medicaid. 
Dated this 30 f U day of J M iV 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Steven Elmo Averett 
J 
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NOTICE OF DECISION 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
CASE NUMBER: 0016671 
HAILING DATE: 
I DOYC2 ALLEN 
689 CA*iYON DRIVE 
SBai&GVlLLE UT 
1 
3A1-1 
84663 
DENY - ASSETS EXCE-ED LIHITS 
DEAR DOYCE ALL£S 
YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, RECEIfED ON FEBRUARY 04, 
1991, HAS BEEN DENIED. THIS IS BECAUSE THE VALUE OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD'S 
TOTAL RESOURCES IS MORE THAN OUR POLICY ALLOWS. 
YOUR RESOURCES 
RE30!JiiC2 LIMIT 
$10,745.90 
$3,000.00 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT 
801 374 7800. COLLECT CALLS WILL BE ACCEPTED. 
THIS ACTIO:'*' IS BASED ON VOLUME IIIF, SECTIONS 503 AND 361, VOLUME 
HID, SECTION 503, AND VOLUME HIM, SECTION 502. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Suzanne Dandoy. M D. M P H. 
Executive Director 
Rod Bern 
Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
288 North 1460 West 
PO 80x16580 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84116-0580 
(801)538-6151 
D0YCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
AND ORDER ON REVIEW 
Case No. 91-067-01 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A RECONSIDERATION 
FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS 
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A 
PETITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS 
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR 
A RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6151. 
IH Oil. IF YOU HAVE 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 
63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review -
Procedure," and Department of Health Administrative Rule R454-14, entitled 
"Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for 
Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and Providers." 
ISSUE 
WAS THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT (OFS) CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE 
PETITIONER WAS OVER THE ASSET LIMIT? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Findings of Fact entered by the presiding officer in Recommended Decision 
No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Conclusions of Law entered by the presiding officer in Recommended 
Decision No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference. 
DISPOSITION 
WHEREFORE, Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 is hereby AFFIRMED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
The rules regarding asset limits are set forth in Assistance Payments 
Administration (APA) Volume III, Section 503. Section 503-1 states in 
relevant part: 
To be eligible for medical assistance, a client's 
countable assets must be less than the applicable asset 
limits.. • • 
Section 503-2 states in relevant part: 
Use assets held on the first moment of a calendar month 
to compute eligibility for that month. The case is 
ineligible for the entire month if countable assets 
exceed limits on the first moment of the month.... 
The table in Section 503-3 indicates that the Medicaid asset limit for a 
household of two individuals is $3,000. 
In this case, the petitioner and his wife held over $3,000 in a savings 
account at the first moment of the month for the months of January and 
February, 1991. Therefore, the decision of 0FS LO deny Medicaid disability 
benefits because of excess assets was correct. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Action and Order 
on Review is issued, you may file a written request for reconsideration with 
the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. Any request for 
reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking 
judicial review. 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of 
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action 
and Order on Review or, if a request for reconsideration is filed and denied, 
within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall 
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the 
specific grounds upon which review is sought. Failure to file.such a petition 
within the 30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of any right to appeal 
the Final Agency Action and Order on Review. 
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A copy of this Final Agency Action and Order on Review shall be sent to 
Petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail, 
return receipt requested. 
DATED this ^ 9 ^ day of April, 1991 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Her Designated and Authorized Representative 
0414H/115-117 
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DOYCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
RECOMMENDED DECISION 
CASE NO. 91-067-01 
Pursuant to Rule R454-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah 
Administrative Hearing Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq., Utah Code 
Anpct-atcd. 1953 as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above 
captioned case was held on the 3rd day of April, 1991, at the Office of Family 
Support located at 150 East Center Street, Provo, Utah, at 10:00 o'clock in 
the A.M., Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer, presiding. The petitioner 
appeared in person. The Office of Family Support/Utah Medical Assistance 
Program ("UMAP") was represented by Jon Wood and Patti Richards. This hearing 
was scheduled verbally and without written notice. Neither party was 
represented by counsel. 
ISSUE 
WERE THE ASSETS OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE THE ASSET LIMIT FOR THE MONTHS OF 
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1991? 
The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife, Lilly, have severe medical 
problems. She is receiving Social Security disability benefits for chronic 
bronchitis. Sh£ is on continuous oxygen for this disorder. She also has to 
be transported to a warmer climate in the winter time when an inversion takes 
place in the Utah County because of her condition. To accomplish this 
purpose, her husband, Doyce Allen, purchased a 1983 Ford pick-up truck and a 
travel trailer. They paid $8,000.00, for the travel trailer two years ago. 
He and his wife used the cash from her Social Security disability hearing to 
do that. The hearing process to obtain Social Security disability required 
them to go to the administrative law judge, and by the time benefits were 
granted, the retroactive benefits exceeded $8,000.00. 
Doyce Allen worked at Intermountain Farmers Co-op for many years and was 
covered under Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance. In 1990, he obtained 
a part-time job with his former employer and reapplied for Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield benefits. He was covered under COBRA benefits until July 1, 1990. A 
letter was sent by his employer with the application on June 15, 1990. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield denied his application for benefits for medical insurance. 
He looked for other insurance and determined that it would cost between 
$400.00 or $500.00 a month for medical insurance, and therefore, he never 
applied. He testified at the hearing that an application to one of these 
other companies may have been denied regardless of the amount of the premium 
he would have been willing to pay. 
In January, 1991, the petitioner suffered a heart attack and had heart-bypass 
surgery. This medical bill remains unpaid. 
The petitioner applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. His income 
was not evaluated, but at the hearing it was determined there would be a 
substantial spendown required in the range of $400.00 to 450.00. The asset 
limit for a family of two is $3,000.00, and the Office of Family Support 
determined that he exceeded that on the basis of his savings account alone. 
The savings account contained $3,029.86 throughout the month of January and up 
to February 6, 1991, at which time Mrs. Allen withdrew the entire balance of 
that account. 
The petitioner was informed at the hearing that the rule for asset 
determination requires that the evaluation take place on the first moment of 
the first day of each month and, therefore, because the funds in his checking 
and savings account were in excess of $3,000.00, the case was properly 
denied, considerable discussion was also entertained on the use of the truck 
and travel trailer for medical purposes, but the amount of the money in the 
savings account alone exceeded the limit, and therefore, the issue of medical 
necessity was moot. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife Lilly, age 62, applied 
for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. 
2. The application of the petitioner included a request for retroactive 
benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately $40,000.00 in medical 
bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart 
surgery. 
3. Lilly Allen, the petitioner's wife, is currently on Social Security 
Disability "and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis, as well 
as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a medical necessity. 
4. The petitioner and his wife held $3,029.00 in a savings account and 
approximately $100.00, in a checking account the first moment of each of 
the months of January and February, 1991. 
5. The petitioner owns a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately 
$2,500.00, which could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile 
and a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The assets of the petitioner and his spouse exceed the $3,000,00, asset limit 
as set forth in APA Volume HID. 
SEASONS FOB PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The petitioner was unable to demonstrate his assets were below the asset limit 
and, therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proof. Many alternatives were 
explored to try to determine that a correct decision was made by the Office of 
Family Support. After careful review with the petitioner of regulations 
requiring that his assets be determined as of the first moment of each month, 
the petitioner understood that his savings account alone exceeded the limit. 
Therefore, the value ascribed to his motor vehicles and the travel trailer 
were not necessary to sustain a denial. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
The decision of the Office of Family Support to deny Medicaid benefits because 
of excess assets is hereby AFFIRMED. 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to ius release. Both the 
Recommended Decision and a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of 
that review, will be released simultaneously by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing. 
DATED this . ( ' day of April, 1991. 
CORNELIUS W. HYZER 
HEARING OFFICER 
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EXHIBITS 
The following exhibits were admitted into evidence: 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT #1 Medicaid application of the petitioner, 
Doyce Allen 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT #2 Checking account and savings account 
bank statements 
0404H/105-108/amh 
Norman H Bangerter 
Gotvrnor 
Suzanne Dandoy. M D„ M P H 
Execiiow Director 
Rod Bern 
Director 
Statt^of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
288 North 1460 West 
PO Box 16580 
Sail Lake City Utah 84116-0580 
(801)538-6151 
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DOYCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 91-067-01 
-00O00-
This request for Reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63-46b-13 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
FACTS 
The Facts set forth in Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 are hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
DISPOSITION 
The above-captioned Request for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
The petitioner, age 64, became uninsurable and had a heart attack on January 
23, 1991, while visiting in Arizona. The petitioner and his wife had enough 
money to return to Utah for bypass surgery. Throughout January, 1991, and up 
to February 6, 1991, the petitioner and his wife had $3,029 in a savings 
account and approximately $100 in a checking account. After applying for 
Medicaid on February 4, 1991, the petitioner's wife immediately withdrew all 
the money in the savings account and closed the account. Medicaid regulations 
require that the assets of an applicant be examined at the first moment of the 
month to determine whether or not they exceed the asset limit. The asset 
limit for the type of Medicaid requested was $3,000.00, leaving excess assets 
In addition to the excess assets in the checking and savings account, there 
were other potential excess assets an unencumbered trailer home worth 
approximately $7,000.00, and an automobile worth $600.00. At the formal 
hearing, the petitioner contended that the trailer was a medical necessity. 
The hearing officer's Recommended Decision correctly denied the petitioner's 
claim solely on the amount of cash available to him, without reaching the 
medical necessity issue. 
The Utah Medicaid Program is funded by a combination of state and federal 
funds. Unfortunately, federal regulations do not allow consideration of 
individual circumstances in the application of income and asset limits. A 
Medicaid agency must use a methodology for the treatment of resotirces that is 
uniform for all individuals in a covered group. When income eligibility is 
the issue, a Medicaid recipient may spenddown excess income each month to 
"buy" a medical card. However, no such provisions exists to reduce assets. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of 
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Response to Request 
for Reconsideration. The petition shall be served upon the Director of Health 
Care Financing, Utah Department of Health and shall state the specific grounds 
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 
30-day time limit may constitute a wavier of any right to appeal this decision. 
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the 
petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail, 
return receipt requested. 
DATED this £& day of June, 1991 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director 
By 
, (^fyu^> 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Her Designated-and Authorized Representative 
0448H/43-44 
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No: 91-067-01 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1991, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for Reconsideration, postage 
prepaid, to the following parties: 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Doyce Allen 
689 Canyon Drive 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Brian Farr 
Office of the Attorney General 
DHS, 4th Floor 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Bob Banta 
DHS, Office of Family Support 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Stephanie Mallory 
DHS, Administrative Hearings 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Jeanie LeBlanc, Medicaid Supervisor 
DHS, Quality Control 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Mike O'Brien, Associate Regional Director 
Office of Family Support 
150 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Jon Wood, Supervisor 
Office of Family Support 
150 East Center^Street 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Ginny Duncan 
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Petitioner, 
v. 
This opinion is subject to revision before m*p - ~
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publication in the Pacific Reporter. mHK \ • 8^2 
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00O00 Gidrk of the Court 
Utaft Court ci Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publ icat ion) 
Utah Department of Health, 
Div i s ion of Health Care 
Financing, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 910287-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 17, 1992) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of 
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart attack while in 
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he 
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs 
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had 
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance 
because he was not sixty-five years old. 
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991, 
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to 
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines 
require that Allen/s assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first 
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In 
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the 
amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100.00, 
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford 
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel 
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00. 
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied 
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the 
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a 
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that 
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29, 
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review, 
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. 
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied. 
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his 
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are 
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from 
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer, 
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical 
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration 
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted 
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in 
ord^ T- to become eligible for Medicaid. 
I. THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND 
Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not 
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is 
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points 
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be 
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the 
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was 
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The 
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's 
will as part of the record on review because it was never 
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing. 
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will 
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from 
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of 
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or 
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is 
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not 
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so 
that an outside observer can see that these funds are 
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin. 
P. R810-304-411(9)(e)(1) (1991). 
Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the 
will until June 10, 199l2, after the hearing officer's 
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on 
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration 
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no 
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before 
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal. 
However, even if we were to consider the general language in 
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly 
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance 
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account 
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During 
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present 
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for 
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically 
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen 
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance 
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a 
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of 
something in case—. "3 Therefore, considering only the savings 
2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the 
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the 
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter, 
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp. 
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid 
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a 
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the 
administrative hearing: 
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the 
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of 
the pavings account? 
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was 
accrued during our heart attack deal here, 
and transportation to and from. 
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on 
medical things? 
MR. ALLEN: Bills again. 
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither 
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately 
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial 
expenses• 
account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings 
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit. 
II. MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN" 
A. An Overview of the Medicaid Program 
Allen alternatively argues that he should have been 
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to 
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid 
regulations to resolve this question. 
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative 
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist 
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program 
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical 
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera. 477 U.S. 154, 
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Utah Deot- of* HPal+-l]. 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with 
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at 
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer 
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its 
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically 
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with 
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife 
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill 
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility 
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects 
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4) , 
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because 
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health 
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated 
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992) . We find it unnecessary to reach these 
issues in view of our determination that Allen's savings account 
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit. 
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq. (1992)). 
needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its 
discretion.8 
B. The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes 
When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources 
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the 
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may 
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them 
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid. 
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires 
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the 
following portion of the Medicaid statutes: 
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must 
(17) . . . include reasonable standards 
. . . for determining eligibility for and the 
extent of medical assistance under the plan 
which (A) are consistent with the objectives 
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking 
into account only such income and resources 
as are . . . available to the applicant or 
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable 
evaluation of any such income or resources, 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). 
8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in 
Schweiker v. Hoqan. 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982): 
Congress has differentiated between the 
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind, 
disabled, or dependent persons who have very 
little income—and other persons with similar 
characteristics who are self-supporting. 
Members of the former class are automatically 
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter 
class are not eligible unless a State elects 
to provide benefits to the medically needy 
and unless their income, after consideration 
of medical expenses, is below state standards 
of eligibility. 
Id., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609. 
and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to 
income by taking into account . . . the costs 
. . . incurred for medical care or for any 
other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added). Courts 
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down rulef" finding 
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant to "spend down" 
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's eligibility 
standards.9 
The question in the present case,- however, is whether the 
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an 
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner. 
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states 
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable. 
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate 
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate 
"resource spend down" within the>ir plans at their discretion. 
9. See, e.g., Atkins, 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the 
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)" allows the 
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income 
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736, 
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986) ("42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down"); 
Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me. 
Nov. 9, 1990)(42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) "specifically requires 
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter O. Boswell 
Memorial HOSP.. Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred 
medical bills from incomo for purposes of determining 
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy' 
procedure, applicants are permitted to *spend down' their excess 
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17) "providefs] for application of the spend down 
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v. 
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to 
mean that * income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."), 
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991). 
Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding 
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend 
down."10 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations 
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend 
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not 
mandated by federal law. 
10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points 
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement. 
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943. 
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is 
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . . Resource spend-down 
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and 
regulations"); Harriman. 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute 
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down 
rule. . . . But there is no similar requirement in the federal 
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois 
Dept. of Pub. Aid. 129 111. 2a 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757 
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section 
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the 
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology 
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid. 
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section 
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource 
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical 
assistance benefits"), aff'd, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me. 
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case 
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not 
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106 
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy 
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely 
from a State's Medicaid program"). 
But see Ramsey. 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority 
in any category for a *spend-down7 of excess resources that is 
similar or identical to the expressly authorized *spend-down' of 
excess income"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of 
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that, 
although "§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing 
states to provide flexibility in their program application 
standards, we note that § 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's 
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income 
or resources'"). 
C. Utah's Medicaid Program 
Since Utah may implement "resource spend down" at its 
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has, 
in fact, adopted "resource spend down" in determining Medicaid 
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend 
down" issues. 
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the 
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981. 2 Utah has 
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13, 
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for 
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's 
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[T]he division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of 
this chapter in an efficient, economical 
manner. The division shall establish, on a 
statewide basis, a program to safeguard 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of 
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and 
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital 
admissions or lengths of stay. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989). 
12. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991). 
13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has 
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah 
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has 
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination, 
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah 
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . . . shall be 
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the 
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(1) 
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency 
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in 
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act.")(emphasis added). 
(2) The department shall develop implementing 
policy in conformity with this chapter, the 
requirements of Title XIX, and applicable 
federal regulations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). 
The department may develop standards and 
administer policies relating to eligibility 
under the Medicaid program. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989). 
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule 
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend 
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits 
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory 
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be 
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards" 
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource 
spend down." 
Furthermore; Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan 
designates cerram assets as exempt in determining eligibility 
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has 
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid 
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the 
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid. 
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other 
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down" 
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid 
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently. 
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for 
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive 
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing 
exemptions. 
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466, 
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state 
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated 
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although 
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it 
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent 
with the goals of Title XIX." Id., 476 N.E.2d at 578. 
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine 
15. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use 
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a 
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down," id. n.9, 
as evidence of "the legislature's determination to ensure an 
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at 
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan 
required "resource spend down." 
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar 
to that of the Halev court in Hession v. Illinois Department of 
Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After 
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not 
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to 
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan 
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from 
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying 
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing 
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has 
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for 
continued independence be maintained and that their limited 
resources be preserved." Id. ,  544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111. 
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear 
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the 
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down." 
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy 
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential 
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining 
16. In fact, one commentator states: 
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that 
some unprepared applicants' assets are 
reduced beyond the poverty level to 
bankruptcy because medical bills in that 
month exceed those resources which the 
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah 
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's 
advantage to put forth any plausible argument 
that a particular value should be counted as 
income rather than asset, if the reverse 
would result in excess assets. Excess assets 
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility: excess 
income means that the applicant will be 
required to shoulder more of [his or] her 
health care costs for that month. 
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988) 
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted). 
the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for 
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the 
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring 
"resource spend down," on the contrary, appear concerned about 
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants. 
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was 
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend 
down" in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan. 
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency 
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this 
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power. 
Utah/s statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine, 
recently reviewed in Harriman v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 
1991). In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend 
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar 
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically 
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical 
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was 
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid 
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to 
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal 
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped 
short of enacting an asset spend-down." Xd. at 1057 (footnote 
omitted). 
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah 
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of 
"resource spend down."18 Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings 
17. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) quoted above. 
18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue 
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public 
policy. See e.g., Foley. 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spend-
down provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid 
program); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of 
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy— 
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the 
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the 
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a state's 
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the 
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kemoson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our 
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid 
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply 
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are 
(continued...) 
account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thus, 
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as 
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
; 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in 
pari-) : 
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from 
part II. 
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible 
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy 
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) 
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on 
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1991).* 
18.(...continued) 
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above 
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable 
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills."). 
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria 
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make. 
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit 
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency 
in the administration of the program simply does not have any 
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program. 
I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable 
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy 
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the 
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets 
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the 
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not 
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would 
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is 
determined. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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Rule 29. Oral argument. 
(a) In general. Oral argument will beaflcm 
all cases unless the court concludes: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
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§416.1212 20 CFR Ch- ill (4-1-91 .Edition 
Mar. 15. 1979; 48 FR 57127. Dec. 28. 1983; 51 
FR 34464. Sept. 29. 1986; 55 FR 28378, July 
11,1990] 
§ 416.1212 Exclusion of the home. 
(a) Defined. A home is any property 
in which an individual (and spouse, if 
any) has an ownership interest and 
which serves as the individual's princi-
pal place of residence. This property 
includes the shelter in which an indi-
vidual resides, the land on which the 
shelter is located and related outbuild-
ings. 
(b) Home not counted. We do no! 
count a home regardless of its value. 
However, see §§416.1220 through 
416.1224 when there is an income-pro-
ducing property located on the home 
property that does not qualify under 
the home exclusion. 
(c) If an individual changes princi-
pal place of residence. If an individual 
(and spouse, if any) moves out of his 
or her home without the intent to 
return, the home becomes a countable 
resource because it is no longer the in-
dividual's principal place of residence. 
If an individual leaves his or her home 
to live in an institution, we still consid-
er the home to be the individual's 
principal place of residence, irrespec-
tive of the individual's intent to 
return, as long as a spouse or depend-
ent relative of the eligible individual 
continues to live there. The individ-
ual's equity in the former home be-
comes a countable resource effective 
with the first day of the month follow-
ing the month it is no longer his or 
her principal place of residence. 
(d) Proceeds from the sale of an ex-
cluded home. The proceeds from the 
sale of a home which is excluded from 
the individual's resources will also be 
excluded from resources to the extent 
they are intended to be used and are, 
in fact, used to purchase another 
home, which is similarly excluded, 
within 3 months of the date of receipt 
of the proceeds. 
[50 PR 42686, Oct. 22, 198!>, as amended at 
51 FR 7437, Mar. 4,1986] 
§416.1216 Exclusion of household goods 
and personal effects. 
(a) Household goods and personal ef-
fects; defined. Household goods are de-
fined as including household furni-
ture, furnishings and equip 
which are commonly found in o n 
a house and are used in COIL__. 
with the operation, maintenance^ 
occupancy of the home. Househo 
goods would also include the fu 
ture, furnishings and equip 
which are used in the functions^afi 
activities of home and family lifeTa? 
well as those items which are for conBj 
fort and accommodation. Personal/IS 
fects are defined as including clothing 
jewelry, items of personal care, lnj|| 
vidual education and 
(b) Limitation on household, 
and personal effects. In deter 
the resources of an individual:(a 
spouse, if any), household goods^ a 
personal effects are excluded if. 
total equity value is $2,000 or le 
the total equity value of hou 
goods and personal effects is i^exc 
of $2,000, the excess is counted ag 
the resource limitation. 
(c) Additional exclusions 
hold goods and personal effects!^ 
termining the resources of an^ faoS 
ual (and spouse, if any) and irijf* 
mining the value of the" hot 
goods and personal effects oil 
dividual (and spouse), there 
excluded a wedding ring and: 
gagement ring and household p 
and personal effects such as pr ^ 
devices, dialysis machines," - ho 
beds, wheel chairs and similar^ 
ment required because of a pf 
physical condition. The exclusl 
items required because of a*pf 
physical condition is not applic* 
items which are used extensive 
primarily by members of the^™» 
hold in addition to the person 
physical condition requires theflTcn 
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20,1975, as ame^ Bdk 
44 FR 43266, July 24, 19793 
§ 416.1218 Exclusion of the automobile 
(a) Automobile; defined. As 
this section, the term automat 
eludes, in addition to pa 
other vehicles used to provide^ 
sary transportation. 
(b) Limitation on automol 
determining the resources of 
vidual (and spouse, if any)^ 
biles are excluded or count 
lows: 
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IX Total exclusion. One automobile 
otally excluded regardless of its 
ae if, for the individual or a 
er of the individual's house-
It is necessary for employment; 
Tit is necessary for the medical 
ent of a specific or regular med-
problem; 
,) It is modified for operation by 
portation of a handicapped 
in; or 
j i t (or other type of vehicle) is 
jcessary because of climate, terrain, 
stance, or similar factors to provide 
gressary transportation to perform 
sential daily activities. 
^Exclusion to $4,500 of the market 
Se If no automobile is excluded 
fier paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 
K** automobile is excluded from 
Smting as a resource to the extent 
{^current market value does not 
$4,500. If the market value of 
automobile exceeds $4,500, the 
,is counted against the resource 
Other automobiles. Any other 
mobiles are treated as nonliquid 
tirces and counted against the re-
limit to the extent of the indi-
*s equity (see § 416.1201(c)). 
JTCurrent market value. The cur-
P;market value of an automobile is average price an automobile of 
E&t particular year, make, model, and 
Edition will sell for on the open 
Brket (to a private individual) in the 
articular geographic area involved. 
PR 48915. Oct. 20. 1975. as amended at 
^FR 43266. July 24. 1979; 50 PR 42687, 
gs 22,19851 
$ ' • 
416.1220 Property essential to self-sup-
p Port; general. 
BVhen counting the value of re-
Sirces an individual (and spouse, if 
By) has, the value of property essen-
tia to self-support is not counted, 
Jthin certain limits. There are dif f er-
Q^rules for considering this property 
iding on whether it is income-
iucing or not. Property essential to 
^support can include real and per-
property (for example, land, 
equipment and supplies, 
or vehicles, and tools, etc.) used in |trade or business (as defined in 
-1066 of part 404), nonbusiness 
jincome-producing property (houses or 
apartments for rent, land other than 
home property, etc.) and property 
used to produce goods or services es-
sential to an individual's daily activi-
ties. Liquid resources other than those 
used as part of a trade or business are 
not property essential to self-support. 
If the individual's principal place of 
residence qualifies under the home ex-
clusion, it is not considered in evaluat-
ing property essential to self-support. 
C50 PR 42687, Oct. 22. 1985] 
§416.1222 How income-producing proper-
ty essential to self-support is counted. 
(a) General When deciding the 
value of property used in a trade or 
business or nonbusiness income-pro-
ducing activity, only the individual's 
equity in the property is counted. We 
will exclude as essential to self-support 
up to $6,000 of an individual's equity 
in income-producing property if it pro-
duces a net annual income to the indi-
vidual of at least 6 percent of the ex-
cluded equity. If the individual's 
equity is greater than $6,000, we count 
only the amount that exceeds $6,000 
toward the allowable resource limit 
specified in §416.1205 if the net 
annual income requirement of 6 per-
cent is met on the excluded equity. If 
the activity produces less than a 6-per-
cent return due to circumstances 
beyond the inividual's control (for ex-
ample, crop failure, illness, etc.), and 
there is a reasonable expectation that 
the individual's activity will again 
produce a 6-percent return, the prop-
erty is also excluded. If the individual 
owns more than one piece of property 
and each produces income, each is 
looked at to see if the 6-percent rule is 
met and then the amounts of the indi-
vidual's equity in all of those proper-
ties producing 6 percent are totaled to 
see if the total equity is $6,000 or less. 
The equity in those properties that do 
not meet the 6-percent rule is counted 
towards the allowable resource limit 
specified in § 416.1205. If the individ-
ual's total equity in the properties pro-
ducing 6-percent income is over the 
$6,000 equity limit, the amount of 
equity exceeding $6,000 is counted as a 
resource towards the allowable re-
source limit. 
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$efn under the State's AFDC plan); 
tf(2) Would be eligible for AFDC if $e State's AFDC plan did not contain 
eligibility requirements more restric-
tive than, or in addition to, those re-
quired under Title IV-A. (b) The agency may cover any AFDC 
optional group without covering all 
locb groups. 
(46 PR 47085, Sept. 30,19811 
OPTIONS FOR COVERAGE OF THE AGED, 
BLIND, AND DISABLED 
I4&230 Individual* receiving only up 
tkmal State supplements. (t) The agency may provide Medic-
tid, in one or more of the following 
classifications, to individuals who re-
ceive only an optional State supple-
ment that meets the conditions speci-
fied in paragraph (b) of this section 
and who would be eligible for SSI 
except for the level of their income: (1) All aged individuals. (2) All blind individuals. (3) All disabled individuals. (4) Only aged individuals in domicili-
ary facilities or other group living ar-
rangements as defined under SSI. (5) Only blind individuals in domicil-
iary facilities or other group living ar-
rangements as defined under SSI. 
(6) Only disabled individuals in 
domiciliary facilities or other group 
living arrangements as defined under 
8SI. 
(7) Individuals receiving a federally 
administered optional State supple-
ment that meets the conditions speci-
fied in this section. (8) Individuals in additional classifi-
cations specified by the Secretary for 
federally administered supplementary 
Payments under 20 CFR 416.2020(d). (b) Payments under the optional 
supplement program must be— (1) Based on need and paid in cash 
°n a regular basis; (2) Equal to the difference between 
toe individual's countable income and 
toe income standard used to deter-
mine eligibility for supplement. Count-
able income is income remaining after 
deductions required under SSI or, at 
State option, more liberal deductions 
are made (see {435.1006 for limita-
tions on FFP in Medicaid expenditures 
for individuals receiving optional State 
supplements); and (3) Available to all individuals in the 
State; however, the plan may provide 
for variations in the income standard 
by political subdivision according to 
cost-of-living differences. 
§435.231 Individuals in institution* who 
are eligible under a special income 
level. 
(a) If the agency provides Medicaid 
under § 435.211 to individuals in insti-
tutions who would be eligible for 
AFDC, SSI, or State supplements 
except for their institutional status, it 
may also cover aged, blind, and dis-
abled individuals in Institutions who— 
(1) Because of their income, would 
not be eligible for SSI or State supple-
ments if they were not institutional-
ized; but (2) Have income below a level speci-
fied in the plan under § 435:722. (See 
§435.1005 for limitations on FFP in 
Medicaid expenditures for individuals 
specified in this section.) 
(b) The agency may cover individ-
uals under this section whether or not 
the State pays optional supplements. 
[43 PR 45204, Sept. 29. 1978, as amended at 
45 PR 24884, Apr. 11, 1980] 
Subpart D—Optional Coverage of the 
Medically Needy 
9435.300 Scope. 
This subpart specifies the option for 
coverage of medically needy individ-
uals. 
9 435.301 General rules. 
(a) A medicaid agency may provide 
Medicaid to individuals specified in 
this subpart who— (1) Either— (i) Have income that meets the ap-
plicable standards In IS 435.812 
through 435.814; or (ii) If their income is more than al-
lowed under those standards, have in-
curred medical expenses at least equal 
Xo the difference between their income 
and the applicable income standard; 
and 
(2) Have resources that meet the ap-
plicable standards in 5 §435.840 
through 435.843. 
lib 
§435.840 42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-90 Edition) 
(d) Optional deductions. In deter-
mining the amount of the individual's 
income to be used to reduce the agen-
cy's payment to the institution, the 
-agency may deduct the following 
amounts from the individual's total 
income as determined under para-
graph (e) of this section: 
(1) Necessary medical or remedial 
services included in the State's. Medic-
aid plan for the medically needy, 
which exceed limitations on amount, 
duration or scope imposed by the 
agency, subject to reasonable limits 
the agency may establish on amounts 
of these expenses; 
(2) Necessary medical or remedial 
care recognized under State ."law but 
not covered under the State's Medic-
aid plan, subject to reasonable limits 
the agency may establish on amounts 
of these expenses; and 
(3) For single individuals and cou-
ples, an amount (in addition to the 
personal needs allowance) for mainte-
nance of the individual's or couple's 
home if— 
(i) The amount is deducted for not 
more than a 6-month period; and 
(ii) A physician has certified that 
either of the individuals is iLkely to 
return to the home within that period. 
(e) Determination of income—(I) 
Option. In determining the amount of 
an individual's income to be used to 
reduce the agency's payment to the in-
stitution, the agency may use total 
income received or it may project total 
monthly income for a prospective 
period not to exceed 6 months.
 / (2) Basis for projection. The agency 
must base the projection on income re-
ceived in the preceding period, not to 
exceed 6 months, and on income ex-
pected to be received. 
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the 
prospective period specified in para-
graph (e)(1) of this section, or when 
any significant change occurs, the 
agency must reconcile estimates with 
income received. 
(f) Determination of medical ex-
penses—il) Option. In determining the 
amount of medical expenses to be de-
ducted from an individual's income, 
the agency may deduct incurr<*d medi-
cal expenses, or it may project medical 
expenses for a prospective period not 
to exceed 6 months. 
(2) Basis for projection. The agency 
must base the estimate on medical ex-
penses incurred in the preceding 
period, not to exceed 6 months, and 
medical expenses expected to be in-
curred. 
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the 
prospective period specified in para-
graph (fXl) of this section, or when 
any significant change occurs, the 
agency must reconcile estimates with 
incurred medical expenses. 
[45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at 
46 FR 47988, Sept 30. 1981; 48 FR 5735. 
Feb. 8, 1983; 53 FR 3596, Feb. 8,1988; 53 FR 
5344, Feb. 23.1988] 
MEDICALLY NEEDY RESOURCE STANDARDS 
§435.840 Medically needy resource stand-
ards: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of medically 
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency 
must use a resource standard under 
this subpart that is— 
(a) Based on family size; 
(b) Uniform for all individuals in a 
gT~i:r • c.~d i 
(c) Reasonable, (See J 435.841) 
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54734, 
Nov. 11.19813 
§435.841 Medically needy resource stand-
ards: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a medically 
needy resource standard that is rea-
sonable, according to the provisions of 
this section. 
(b) The following medically needy 
resource standards are presumed to be 
reasonable: 
(1) The agency provides one medical-
ly needy resource standard for all cov-
ered medically needy groups. Except 
as provided in paragraph (c) of this 
section, the standard must at least 
equal the highest resource standard 
used to determine eligibility in the 
cash assistance programs related to 
the covered medically needy groups, 
(2) The agency provides a different 
medically needy resource standard for 
each covered medically needy group. 
Except as provided in paragraph (c) of 
this section, the standard for each cov-
ered group must at least equal the 
highest resource standard used to de-
termine eligibility in the cash assist-
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ance program related to that covered 
medically needy group. 
(c) In the case of an agency that pro-
vides Medicaid for the aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals only if they meet 
more restrictive requirements than 
used under SSI, the following provi-
sions apply: 
(1) The agency may use a resource 
standard for those individuals that is 
fewer than the standard specified in 
paragraph (b) of this section. 
<2) The lower standard must at least 
equal the medically needy resource 
Standard for those aged, blind, or dis-
abled individuals under the State's 
plan on January 1,1972. 
[d) If the agency uses a medically 
needy resource standard not specified 
{n:paragraphs (b) and (c) of this sec-
t ion-
al) That standard is not presumed to 
be reasonable; and 
(2) HCPA must approve the stand-
ard 
{46 FR 47988. Sept 30. 1981 46 FR 54743, 
Nov. 11,19813 
ft 43&843 Medically needy resource stand 
ards: State plan requirements. 
(a) The State plan must specify the 
resource standard for each covered 
medically needy group. 
(b) If the agency uses a resource 
standard that is not presumed to be 
reasonable under § 435.841, the State 
plan must describe that standard. 
C46 FR 47989, Sept 30.1981] 
PETERMINING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS 
OF RESOURCES 
1435.845 Medically needy resource flui-
bility. 
To determine eligibility on the basis 
of resources for medically needy indi-
viduals, the agency must— 
(a) Consider only the individual's re-
sources and those that are considered 
available to him under the financial 
responsibility requirements for rela-
tives in 1435.821, §435.822 or 
1435.823; 
(b) Consider only resources available 
during the peried-fcr which income is 
computed under 1435.831(a); 
(c) For individuals under age 21 and 
caretaker relatives, deduct the value of 
resources that would be deducted in 
determining eligibility under the 
State's AFDC plan; 
(d) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals in States covering all SSI re-
cipients, deduct the value of resources 
that would be deducted in determining 
eligibility under SSI; 
(e)(1) For aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividuals in States using requirements 
more restrictive than SSI, deduct the 
value of resources in an amount no 
more restrictive than those deducted 
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 
1972 and no more liberal than those 
deducted in determining eligibility 
under SSI. 
(2) However, the amounts specified 
in' paragraph (eXl) of this section 
must be the same as those that would 
be deducted in determining, under 
{ 435.121, the eligibility of the categor-
ically needy; and 
(f) Apply the resource standards es-
tablished under § 435.843. 
[43 FR 45204, Sept 29, 1978, as amended at 
45 FR 24886. Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 4798<» 
Sept. 30, 19813 
TREATMENT or INCOME AND RESOURCES 
§435.850 TiVrtlment ol income and re-
sources: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of medically 
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency 
must use a methodology for the treat-
ment of income and resources that is— 
(a) Uniform for all individuals in a 
covered group; and 
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851). 
[46 FR 47989. Sept 30,1981] 
§435.851 Treatment ol tncuuu and II 
sources: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a methodol-
ogy for the treatment of income and 
resources, to determine eligibility of 
the medically needy, that is reasona-
ble. . 
(b) The methodology used to deter-
mine eligibility of individuals in the 
cash assistance program related to the 
covered medically needy group is pre-
sumed to be reasonable. 
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid 
for the aged, blind, or disabled individ-
uals who meet more restrictive re-
quirements than used under SSI, the 
methodology for the treatment of 
p t^fi Care Financing Administration, HHS §436.112 
QdegoricaUy needy means aged, 
pxL or disable individuals or families 
Children 
E) Who are otherwise eligible for 
B a l d and who meet the financial 
Kflity requirements for OiLA, 
R c AB, AFTD, or AABD; or, 
K Whose categorical eligibility is 
beted by statute (e*g., persons who 
Ei td increased OASDI payments. 
E | 436.112). 
Wmttiet and children refers to ellgi-
KoKmbers of families with childiren 
b sre financially eligible uaier 
B C or medically needy rules and 
bare deprived of parental support 
•one as defined under the AFDC 
b a m (see 45 CFR 233.90; 233.100). 
Lacktition, this group includes iridl-
pah under age 21 who are not de-
lied of parental support or care but 
k are financially eligible under 
•DC or medically needy rules -Csee 
•tai l coverage group, 1436.222); 
ptffc^! n~dy rr^ — *?** w - d , 
Wabled individuals or families and 
Hren who are otherwise eligible for 
Incaid, who are not categorically 
my and whose income and resources 
I within limits set under the Me<iic-
Mtateplan. 
PU means old age assistance under 
P i of the Act; 
UiSDi means old age, survivors, and 
pfaQlty insurance under Title n of 
Act 
t45218, Sept. 29,1978, as amended at 
24887. Apr. 11. 1080; 46 PR 47 MO. 
t-JO. 10811 
!• State plan requirement*. 
kState plan must— 
JW Provide that the requirement!* of 
PPtrt are met; and 
PMSpedfy the groups to whom 
pfctid is provided, as specified in 
Stouts B, C, and D of this part, and conditions of eligibility for Individ-fe* those groups. 
Import B Mondctory Coveroge of 
the Categorically Noody 
1436.110 Individuals receiving cash aatist-
(bit 
10 8eope. 
subpart — _ - prescribes require-
PJJ* f o r coverage of categorically 
Jw individuals. 
(a) A Medicaid agency must provide 
Medicaid to individuals receiving cash 
assistance under OAA, AFDC, AB, 
AFTD, or AABD. 
(b) For purposes of this section, an 
individual is receiving cash assistance. 
If his needs are considered in deter-
mining the amount of the payment. 
This includes an individual whose 
presence in the home is considered es-
sential to the well-being of a recipient 
under the Bute's plan for OAA, 
AFDC, AB, AFTD, or AABD if that 
plan were as broad as allowed under 
the Act for FFP. 
0 436.111 Indrridoali who are not eligible 
for cash assistance because of a re-
quirement not applicable under Medic-
aid. 
The agency must provide Medicaid 
to individuals who would be eligible 
for OAA, AFDC, AB, ATTD, zz AA3D 
except for an eligibility requirement 
used in those programs that is specif i-
cally prohibited under title XTX 
|[47 PR 43648, Oct 1,1982] 
EDITORIAL NOTE Section 436.111 was re-
vised at 47 FR 43648. Oct 1. 1982. The re-
porting and/or recordkeeping requirements 
contained in this section are not effective 
until OMB approval has been obtained. 
9436.112 Individuals who would be eligi-
ble for cash assistance except for in-
creased OASDI under Pub. L. 92-336 
(July 1,1972). 
The agency must provide Medicaid 
to individuals who meet the following 
conditions: 
(a) In August 1972, the individual 
was entitled to OASDI and— 
(1) He was receiving cash assistance; 
or 
(2) He would have been eligible for 
cash assistance if he had applied, and 
the Medicaid plan covered this option-
al group; or 
(3) He would have been eligible for 
cash assistance if he were not in a 
medical Institution or Intermediate 
care facility, and the Medicaid plan 
covered this optional group. 
(b) The individual would currently 
be eligible for cash assistance except 
that the increase in OASDI under 
165 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING, POLICY AND PLANNING R455-1-5 
K9. Nursing Facility Preadmission/Continued 
ay Review and Level of Care Criteria. 
•-10. Pharmacy Policy. 
K11. Podiatry Services, 
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R455-1-1 
As a condition for receipt of Federal funds under 
title XIX of the Social Security Act, the UTAH 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (single State 
agency) submits the following State plan for the med-
ical assistance program, and hereby agrees to admin-
ister the program in accordance with the provisions of 
this State plan, the requirements of titles XI and XIX 
of the Act, and all applicable Fe^or"° ~>£"i<»Hnn<5 and 
other official issuances of the Department. 
R455-1-2. Section 1: Single State Agency Organi-
zation. 
1.1 Designation and Authority 
(a) The UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH is the single State Agency designated to 
administer or supervise the administration of the 
Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act. (All references in this plan to "the Medicaid 
agency" mean the agency named in this paragraph). 
Attachment 1.1A is a certification signed by the 
State Attorney General identifying the single State 
agency and citing the legal authority under which it 
administers or supervises administration of the pro-
gram. 
R455-1-3 
1.1(b) The State agency that administered or super-
vised the administration of the plan approved under 
title X of the Act as of January 1, 1965, has been 
separately designated to administer or supervise the 
administration of that part of this plan which relates 
to blind individuals. 
X Not applicable. The entire plan under title XDC is 
administered or supervised by the State agency 
named in paragraph 1.1(a). 
R455-1-4 
1.1(c) Waivers of the single State agency require-
ment which are currently operative have been 
granted under authority of the Intergovernmental 
Cooperation Act of 1968. 
X Not applicable. No waivers have ever been 
granted. 
R455-1-5 
1.1(d) 
K455-1-6 HEALTH 
X Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under 
this plan are made by the agencydes) specified m 
Attachment 2.2A. There is a written agreement be-
tween the agency named in paragraph 1.1(a) and 
other agency(ies) making such determinations for 
specific groups covered under this plan. The agree-
ment defines the relationships and respective respon-
sibilities of the agencies. 
R455-1-6 
1.1(e) All other provisions of this plan are adminis-
tered by the Medicaid agency except for those func-
tions for which final authority has been granted to a 
Professional Standards Review Organization under 
title XI of the Act. 
(f) All other requirements of 42 CFR 431.10 are 
met. 
R455-1-7 
1.2 Organization for Administration 
(a) Attachment 1.2A contains a description of the 
organization and functions of the Medicaid agency 
and organization chart of the agency. 
(b) Within the State agency, the DIVISION OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND STANDARDS 
has been designated as the medical assistance unit. 
Attachment 1.2B contains a description of the organi-
zation and functions of the medical assistance unit 
and an organization chart of the unit 
(c) Attachment 1.2C contains a description of the 
kinds and numbers of professional medical personnel 
and supporting staff used in the administration of the 
plan and their responsibilities. 
(d) Eligibility determinations are made by State or 
local staff of an agency other than the agency named 
in paragraph 1.1(a). Attachment 1.2D contains a de-
scription of the staff designated to make such deter-
mination and the functions they will perform. 
R455-1-8 
1.3 Statewide Operation 
The plan is in operation on a Statewide basis in 
accordance with all requirements of 42 CFR 431.50. 
X The plan is state administered. 
R455-1-9 
1.4 State Medical Care Advisory Committee 
There is an advisory committee to the Medicaid 
agency director on health and medical care services 
established in accordance with and meeting all the 
requirements of 42 CFR 431.12. 
R455-1-10. Section 2: Coverage and Eligibility. 
2.1 Application, Determination of Eligibility and 
Furnishing Medicaid 
(a) The^Medicaid agency meets all requirements of 
42 CFR Part 435, Subpart J for processing applica-
tions, determining eligibility and furnishing Medi-
caid. 
R455-M1 
2.1(b) Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services 
under the plan during the three months preceding 
the month of application, if they were, or on applica-
tion would have been, eligible. The effective date of 
prospective and retroactive eligibility is specified m 
Attachment 2.6A. 
2.1(c) The Medicaid agency elects to enter into a 
risk contract with an HMO that is 
X Not Federally qualified, but meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR 434.20(c) and is defined in Attach-
—nt 2.1A. 
R455-M2 
2.2 Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility 
Medicaid is available to groups specified in'AtfcSH! 
ment 2.2A. 
X Both categorically needy and medically .need* 
The conditions of eligibility that must be metf£r£ 
specified in Attachment 2.6A. 
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR Part3435faig 
met. 
R455-M3 
2.3 Residence 
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals ^ whq 
are residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.4QH 
R455-M4 
2.4 Blindness 
(a) The definition of blindness in terms of ophthag 
mic measurement used in this plan is spedfieaaui 
Attachment 2.6A. 
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.63Q.aiio; 
42 CFR 435.531 are met. 
R455-M5 
2.5 Disability 
(a) The definition of disability that is used in this 
plan is specified in Attachment 2.6A. 
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.540 and 
435.541 are met. 
R455-1-16 
2.6 Financial Eligibility 
(a) Categorically needy 
rv, wui. respect to AFDC-related families and^u? 
dividuals under age 21 (not otherwise eligible ^cjeij 
this plan), the financial eligibility conditions of tne 
State's approved AFDC plan apply. 
(2) With respect to aged, blind and disabled lndi| 
viduals, the financial eligibility conditions describe! 
in Attachment 2.6A apply. 
(3) All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435; Subpar^ 
G and H are met with respect to the families*'""* 
individuals to whom the requirements apply 
R455-M7 
2.6(b) Medically needy 
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435, Subparts^? 
and I are met with respect to the families and indivul" 
uals to whom the requirements apply. The leyelm 
income and resources, expressed in total i^lSUS 
amounts, that are used as a basis for establishing 
eligibility under the plan are as described in Attach-
ment 2.6A. 
R455-M8 
2.7 Medicaid Furnished out of State 
Medicaid is furnished under the conditions ^p&a 
fied in 42 CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual whjSI 
a resident of the State while the individual is ii*«§2§ 
other state, to the same extent that Medicaid is1*!£; 
nished to residents in the State. 
R455-1-19 
3.1 Amount, Duration and Scope of Services 
(a) Medicaid is provided in accordance with theTg 
quirements of 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart B.
 v 
(lXi) Each item of service listed in section &0Q| 
(aXD through (5) of the Act, as defined in 42 CfcR 
Part 440, Subpart A is provided for the categorically 
needy. 
(ii) Nurse-midwife services listed in secWtf 
1905(aX17) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR 440iW 
are provided for the categorically needy to the extern 
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5. Subtract medical insurance premiums and pay-
ments for medical services, see section 309.32. 
6. If the client is a resident of a nursing home, the 
client must pay the rest of the income to the nursing 
home. If the client is a resident of another kind of 
medical institution, the client must spend down to 
the district office. 
R810-303-375. Changes In Circumstances — Res-
idents of Medical Institutions. 
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institu-
tion. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a 
medical institution. 
375.1 Client Responsibility 
The client is responsible to report within 10 days 
any change in income or circumstances which may 
affect eligibility. 
375.2 Date of Income Change 
Consider the date of receipt of income as the date of 
change. 
R810-303-377. Residents of Medical Institutions 
and Veteran's Administration (VA) Benefits. 
A VA benefit recipient may be eligible for in-
creased benefits when they enter a medical institu-
tion. These increased benefits are called Aid and At-
tendance. Also, potential VA recipients may become 
eligible for VA benefits when they enter a medical 
institution. Potential recipients include a veteran, or 
the spouse, parent, or child of a veteran. 
When you identify a recipient or potential recipient 
who has enteicJ a medical institution, take one of 
these actions: 
1. Notify ORS. 
2. If the client or his family wishes to apply di-
rectly to the VA, they may do so. Notify ORS. 
3. If the OCO worker wishes to apply directly with 
the VA, you may do so. Notify ORS. 
To notify ORS, use VA Form 21-8416a (Request for 
Information Concerning Unreimbursed Family Medi-
cal Expenses). This form is the minimum that you 
must send to ORS. If you have more information or a 
copy of the complete application, send it too. Send the 
form as soon as possible after application. The VA 
will pay only from the date this form is received by 
them. 
If the client is in a nursing home, tell the nursing 
home operator to immediately report any increased 
benefits. Control for the increased benefits on Form 
62 or Form 69. 
If you have any questions about application for in-
creased veteran's benefits, you may call the ORS Vet-
eran's Benefits Coordinator at 538-4534. 
377.1 Treatment of Lump Sum VA Benefits 
Break any lump sum payment into Aid and Atten-
dance and regular pension. 
1. Tell ORS of the Aid and Attendance amount. 
ORS will collect any Aid and Attendance for the time 
period that the client recieved Medicaid. 
2. Consider the remainder of a VA lump sum pay-
ment as income in the month received. If the client is 
a resident of a nursing home and it is too late to be 
correctly reflected on the APA file, use the Form 
417A to notify the nursing home and HCF. 
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R810-304. Medicaid: Asset Standards. 
R810-304-400. Asset Standards. 
R810-304-4Q3. Asset Limits. 
R810-304-405. Real Property. 
R810-304-4Q7. Personal Property. 
R810-304-409. Availability of Assets. 
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets. 
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets. 
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases. 
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property. 
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets. 
R810-304-441. Third Party Liability (TPL) — All 
Cases. 
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The As-
sets of Sponsors — All Cases. 
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions. 
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions. 
R810-304-400. Asset Standards. 
1. This section describes asset* standards for all 
Medicaid clients. 
2. An Asset is available when the client owns it, or 
has the legal right to sell it or dispose of it for his own 
benefit. (See Sec. 409.) 
3. The assets of a ward controlled by a legal guard-
ian are available to the ward. This is true even if the 
ward is not living with the guardian. If the asset is a 
trust, follow the rules on trusts. (See Sec. 409.6.) 
4. Do not count money as an asset in the same 
month it is counted as income. 
R810-304-403. Asset limits. 
Base asset levels on the same number of persons 
included in the Basic Maintenance Standard (BMS): 
—»i«cr'"v * 
N u m b e r In B M S Asse t Level 
1 person BMS $2,000 
2 person BMS $3,000 
Each additional person in add $25 
the BMS 
Use section 329 to set the number of persons in the 
BMS. 
Close the case or deny the application when the 
countable value of all assets is more than the asset 
limits. 
403.1 The Value of Assets 
Judge assets by their equity value. An exception is 
made for vehicles in A, B and D cases. (See Sec. 
411-5.) 
1. Equity value is the current market value less 
any debts owing on the asset. 
2. Current market value is the item's selling price 
on the open market as set by current standards of 
appraisal. 
Assets: Any real or personal property that has 
money value. (See Sec. 405 and 407) 
403.11 F and C Cases 
For both applications and open cases, if asset levels 
are met at any time in a month, they are met for the 
entire month. 
403.12 AtB, and D Cases 
For both applicants and open cases, use assets held 
on the first moment of a calendar month to compute* 
eligibility for that month. The case is ineligible for. 
the entire month if countable assets exceed limits on 
the first moment of the month. 
1. However, when the asset level is exceeded and a 
checking account is part of it, look at checks written 
prior to the first moment of the month which had not 
cleared as of the first moment. 
2. Do not count such checks in the asset computa-
tion. 
Subtract these checks from the checking balance. 
403.2 SSI Recipient 
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An SSI recipient must meet Medicaid asset limits 
When these limits are exceeded, close the case or 
deny the application 
£1403.3 Deeming of Parental Assets to D and B Chil 
dren 
K
 jWhen a D or B unemancipated child is a Medicaid 
recipient and lives with his parents, count his par 
eats' assets. It does not matter whether either parenl 
is, eligible. In this situation, follow the rules below 
I 1. Apply all asset exclusions of the D or B program 
to the parent's assets 
I 2. From the value of the parent's countable assets 
deduct the one person $1,900 or two person $2,850 
asset limit depending on whether there are 1 or 2 
parents m the home Do not allow the $25 00 exemp-
tion for each additional household member 
J* 3. When more than one child is D or B, divide the 
parents' countable assets equally between each eligi-
ble^ child. 
^ 4 . Allow each eligible B or D child the $1,900 limit 
r
-Jtotal countable assets 
pie. 
i Blakes have five children living at home. Tom 
>17) and Tim (age 16) are SSI recipients Neither 
om nor Tim have any assets of his own Mr and 
_Ers. Blake have a $5,000 00 savings account Of this 
$2J850.00 IS exempt as a parental asset exclusion. 
Tins leaves a countable asset of $2,150 00 ($5,000 00 
p-" $2,850 00 = $2,150 00) Of this $1,075 00 is 
deemed to each eligible D or B child ($2,150 00 di-
vided by 2 equals $1,075 00) In this example neither 
cfiild's assets exceed $1,900 00 Both are eligibile 
based on their assets 
R810-304-405. Real Property. 
^Real property mcludes itemsjvhich may be fixed or 
permanent, such as 1and, houses, buildings, and 
trailer homes 
ft# 
R810-304-407. Personal Property. 
Kgersonal property is an item other than real prop-
erty.'! Some examples are 
j^ir" Liquid assets such as savings and checking ac-
counts, stocks, water stock, bonds, mutual fund 
Shares, promissory notes, mortgages, insurance poll-
£g£rust funds, and agreements in escrow 
gHbtor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, 
bikes, snowmobiles, etc 
ats, campers and trailers 
^Implements, instruments, and tools 
livestock. 
Merchandise and inventory 
?Time shares and time share agreements 
[liquid Assets Assets in cash or payable in cash on 
R810-304-409. Availability of Assets. 
409.1 Jomt Accounts 
l^When an account is jointly held by a client and 
goineone who is not eligible, count all the funds as an 
jftwet'for the client if he can legally withdraw funds 
frpmtthe account If more than one of the account 
is eligible, divide the funds equally among 
[the client claims that the asset does not belong to 
" "* f him to refute it. He can refute it by provid-
itement about the ownership of the funds 
tement should include the reason the joint 
was set up and who made the deposits to and 
iwals from the account, and 
statements from the other account 
If the asset belongs to someone else, the money 
must be removed or access must be restricted If this 
is not done, count all the funds as an asset for the 
entire time access was not restricted If access is re-
stricted, do not count the asset back through the en-
tire period the client is able to refute his ownership 
Example In October you discover Mr Jones had a 
savings account in his name and that of his father 
Mr Jones has been a joint owner of this account since 
January when first started receiving assistance He 
proves that all deposits and withdrawals have been 
made by his father and are his father's money Mr 
Jones has his name removed from the account m Oc-
tober Exempt the asset back to January 
2 When the assets of an A, B, or D SSI recipient 
are combined with those of an F or C family unit, 
such as m a savings account, decide the portion of the 
asset available to the F or C household as follows 
a If the asset is jointly owned, divide the value 
equally among the owners 
Account* A contract of deposit of funds between de-
positors and a financial institution This includes 
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, 
share accounts, etc 
b If you can identify exempt funds, such as a lump 
sum SSI payment which is exempt for 6 months after 
receipt, do not count them until after the exempt pe-
riod has expired 
409 2 Joint Ownership of Assets 
If property is owned by more than one person, de 
termine the client's share Plural ownership can exist 
in different forms 
In Utah these are 
1 Joint-tenancy 
2 Tenancy-m-common 
3 Not cneci^ **^ TTip nrooertv is simnly recorded in 
the names of 2 or more persons Ownership is ten 
ancy-in-common unless stated to be otherwise 
In all 3 cases, each owner has the legal right to sell 
only his share of the property Unless there is a condi-
tion of ownership specifically prohibiting sale of any 
part of the asset without permission of the other 
owners, the client's share is an available asset If 
there is such a condition, see Sec 409 3 
However, when other owners refuse to sell the 
property, the fair market value of the client's share 
may be reduced In such a case, allow the client to 
refute the determination of his equity by providing a 
statement from a knowledgeable source documenting 
the fair market value of the client's share based on 
the particular circumstances of the case 
The laws on plural ownership may differ for prop-
erty located in other states If you have a case with 
property in another state under plural ownership, 
contact the State APA Office 
409 3 When Legal Factors Hinder Making an As-
set Available 
1 If legal factors hinder making the asset avail-
able, it is exempt until it can be made available (See 
2 below) For example, a condition of ownership may 
prohibit selling the asset without the consent of both 
parties. In this case, the asset is exempt until the 
condition of ownership is changed or both parties con-
sent to the sale. 
2. If an asset is not legally available but can be 
made available by client action, the client must take 
steps to make it available. There are 2 exceptions 
These are 
a It is doubtful that reasonable actions will suc-
ceed This should be confirmed by a knowledgeable 
source, such as a lawyer or financial institution 
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b. The likely cost of making the asset available 
exceeds its value. 
If 2a or 2b applies, explain this in the case log and 
do not count the asset. Otherwise, require the client 
to take all reasonable steps to make the asset avail-
able. The asset is exempt while these steps are being 
taken. 
For applicants, such steps must begin before the 
application is approved. For ongoing cases, such steps 
must begin before any more assistance is issued, pro-
vided 10 day notice can be given. If such steps are not 
taken, or if the client does not follow through with 
the process, close or deny the case. 
409.4 Transfer of Title 
1. Vehicles — including motor vehicles, trailers, 
etc. 
Unless you have reason to question ownership of a 
vehicle, accept the bill of sale or other legal document 
as proof of ownership. When questioning ownership, 
remember that until the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles issues a new certificate of registration and certif-
icate of ownership, the transfer of title is incomplete. 
If transfer is incomplete, legal ownership is re-
tained by the original owner and the vehicle is avail-
able to him alone, and not to the new owner. 
If transfer is complete, legal ownership is with the 
new owner. 
2. All Other Property with a Title Document. 
When the client states property has been sold, but 
the title document has not been transferred, contact 
the State APA Office to determine the availability of 
the property. Send all document: relo,,-J ! ? the pov-
erty and the transfer. Be sure to include any condi— 
tions attached to the transfer. 
If the State APA Office determines that the asset is 
not available because title has not been transferred, 
follow the rules in Sec. 409.3. 
409.5 Divorce Decrees 
Review divorce decrees on a case-by-case basis. 
1. Before a divorce is final: 
The filing of a divorce petition does not change the 
ownership or availability of assets unless there is a 
court order specifically dealing with the assets. Un-
less there is such a court order, base availability on 
the ownership prior to the filing of the divorce peti-
tion. 
If there is a question of an asset's availability after 
viewing the court order, contact the State APA Of-
fice. 
2. After a divorce is final: 
a. When there is no title document, a divorce de-
cree can transfer legal title of personal property. But 
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans-
fer: liens, conditions concerning remarriage, etc. 
These conditions may restrict the sale of the asset. If 
so, see Sec. 409.2-2. 
b. In cases of property where there is a title docu-
ment, be sure the title has been transferred. Again, 
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans-
fer. If title has not been transferred, see Sec. 409.4. 
409.6 Trusts 
The rules which follow are guidelines to help you 
determine the availability of trust funds. Sometimes 
you will have to get more information or a legal opin-
ion about trust funds. This can occur even when you 
have complete documentation. In these cases, be sure 
to send a copy of the trust agreement to the State 
APA Office for a decision about the availability of the 
trust. 
409.61 Definitions 
1. Trust: A right of property held by one party for 
another. 
2. Trustee: The person who holds the legal title to 
property for the benefit or use of another. 
3. Beneficiary: The person for whose benefit the 
trust is created. Although this person does not hold 
legal title, he does have an ownership interest. 
The beneficiary can receive money from the trust 
directly or through the trustee. 
409.62 Availability to the Trustee 
1. The entire trust is available as an asset if the 
client is the trustee and has the legal ability to: 
a. Revoke the trust, and 
b. Use the money for his own benefit. 
2. The entire trust is available if: 
a. The trust was created by the client or his spouse 
and 
b. The client or his spouse has the right to dissolve 
the trust, and 
c. He can use the money for his own benefit. 
3. In all other cases, the trust is not available to 
the trustee. 
409.63 Availability to the Beneficiary — All Cases 
If the client is the beneficiary and access to the 
trust is not restricted, the full value of the trust is an 
available asset. If access is restricted, see 409.64 and 
409.65 below. 
409.64 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to 
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by the Client or His 
Spouse — All Cases 
1. With the exception of burial trusts, these rules 
apply to all trusts, including irrevocable trusts. 
2. Potential payments in the budget month from 
ine trust are an available asset if the client or his 
spouse set up the trust. The value of the asset is the 
maximum amount that the trustee can disburse to 
the client when exercising his full discretion under 
the terms of the trust. It does not matter whether 
disbursement is actually made. The potential dis 
bursement can include both income and principle of 
the trust. 
409.65 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to 
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by Someone Other 
Than the Client or His Spouse 
For A, B, and D Cases 
If the client's access to the trust principle is re-
stricted*, the principle is not an available asset. This 
is true even when the trust: 
1. Can be revoked by someone other than the bene-
ficiary, and 
2. Provides a regular payment from the principle 
to the beneficiary. 
Payments made to the client from the trust are 
income. 
For F and C Cases 
The principle is an available asset if there is access 
to the principle to meet the needs of a household 
member. It does not matter if access is restricted. If 
the only way to access the trust is by approval of the 
court, require the client to petition the court to re-
lease the funds in the trust. Follow the procedures in, 
Sec. 409.3. 
When disbursement is limited to specific and lim-j 
ited needs or the principle cannot be invaded, the] 
trust may not be available. (See 409.68.) 
For example, when disbursement of funds of a trust 
set up from an insurance settlement is legally limited 
to payment of medical bills arising from an accident, 
the trust is not available. However, forward informa-" 
tion about the trust to ORS. In this case, there is TPL 
coverage ORS must pursue. 
409.66 Trusts Set Up for the Purpose of Qualifying 
for Medicaid 
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When it appears that a trust has been established 
to allow the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid, sub-
mit the trust document and all other pertinent infor-
mation to the State APA Office for a decision on the 
availability of the trust 
Restricted Access: Only the court or the trustee, 
who is not the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's spouse 
ori parent, can invade the principle of the trust, 
fc 409.67 Trusts Set Up to Pay For Medical Expenses 
Related to Organ Transplants 
Send a copy of all trust set up to pay expenses re-
lated to organ transplants to the State APA Office for 
a decision regarding the availability of the trust. 
409.68 When Availability is Not Clear 
When you cannot determine whether all or part of 
a trust is available, submit it and all other pertinent 
documents to the State APA Office for a decision. 
RglO-304-411. Exempt Assets. 
Allow the following exemptions for medical assis-
tance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See 
Section 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medi-
cal cases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use 
fhe*F or C policy. 
11 One Home and Lot — All Cases 
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and 
lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the 
client 
a. F and C Cases — The lot on which the home 
stands shall not exceed the average size of residential 
lots in the community where it is. Count the equity 
value of property exceeding an average size lot. 
tt A, B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all 
contiguous property. 
Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the 
life estate continues^to live in the home. 
2. One Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resi-
dent of a Medical Institution — All Cases 
When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a 
Home, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the 
home or life estate becomes countable unless: 
a. The person's stay in the medical institution will 
hejshort term. A stay is short term if a doctor says 
jflyf*_the client is likely to return home within 6 
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution 
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or 
^&" The person states that he intends to return 
hornet It does not matter whether the person actually 
re&rns home within 6 months. There is no time limit 
iofthi8 exemption. The statement of intent must be in 
wgting from the client or his representative, or 
I- dThe person has a spouse, dependent child, or rel-
ative* who lives in the home. 
fc^3. Water Rights — All Cases 
^Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot. 
euRelative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, step-
mother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece, 
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sis-
ter^ brother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
IfcijJHousehold Goods and Personal Effects 
[ULand C Cases 
([Exclude the contents of the home that are essential 
J^daily living. However, individual items with an 
Rljw .over $1,000 must be counted against the asset 
AjjB, and D Cases 
. ^ Exclude household goods and personal effects only 
ta the extent they do not exceed $2,000. 
&In developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no 
At&gle items with a value (as can be currently sold) of 
$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt 
amount to be exceeded. 
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or 
more, then consider all other household goods and 
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the 
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and 
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards 
the household's asset level. 
5. Vehicles 
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to 
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to pro-
vide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any 
equity value in excess of this amount towards the 
household's asset limitation. 
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regard-
less of value if: 
a. It is necessary for employment; or 
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year 
for obtaining medical treatment; or 
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person. 
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or 
other such factors to provide transportation for essen-
tial daily activities. 
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above rea-
sons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market 
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value 
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess to-
wards the asset limit. 
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards 
asset limits. 
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases 
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust 
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan. 
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable 
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund 
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
7. Life Insurance 
A, B, and D Cases 
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the 
total face value of all such policies does not exceed 
$1,500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds 
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all 
that individual's policies against the asset limit Up 
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used 
as a burial/funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term in-
surance policies have no cash value, are not re-
sources, and are not used in any way in determining 
countable assets. 
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be 
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral 
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy 
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid 
on the cash value is greater than that used to com-
pute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the 
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of 
policies that have been held for a long time. When 
there is countable cash value that, combined with 
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you 
should obtain a current statement of the cash value. 
F and C Cases 
Count the cash value of life insurance policies. 
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases 
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to 
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for 
any member of the client's immediate family. This 
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave 
markers, etc Also, if a client owns a grave site, the 
value of which includes opening and closing, the 
value of these services is also excluded. 
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include 
many of the items exempted in this section. However, 
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these types of contracts are merely promising these 
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.) 
radftrecftw&vdeTOdto bfc ^ ^aj&^tk* tetrad. <rc l^axv. 
They are not evaluated separately. They are consid-
ered for exemption under Section 411, (9). 
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases 
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for 
each eligible household member. Compute this burial 
or funeral fund exemption as follows: 
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable bur-
ial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund ex-
emption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at 
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral 
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go 
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable 
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an 
asset. 
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce 
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by 
the total face value of any exempt whole life insur-
ance policies. If the face value of these policies ex-
ceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c. 
The amount of face value which exceeds the remain-
ing burial or funeral fund exemption level is not 
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and 
C categories as life insurance is already counted. 
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable 
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life in-
surance policies there is still a balance in the burial 
or funeral fund exemption, reduce the remaining ex-
emption level by the cash value of any burial con-
tract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial. 
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash 
value of non-exempt life insurance policies. 
e. If these reductions result in an exemption 
greater than $1,500 then the difference is to be added 
to the other countable assets. 
(1) Any interest which is accrued on an exempt 
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for 
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or 
as income. 
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are sepa-
rately identified and not commingled with other 
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an 
outside observer can see that these funds are specifi-
cally for the client's burial expense. 
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or inter-
est from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan, 
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy 
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their 
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the ac-
count ma&t be counted aa uvcaine. The asaauxvt re-
maining in the fund is still exempt. 
If a client has a previously unreported resource 
which he claims is to be used for burial: 
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being 
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it 
was either designated or intended for burial. How-
ever, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and 
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of 
application. 
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D case and the re-
source is not clearly designated as being for burial, it 
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the 
first day of the month the client intended to set it 
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before 
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2 
years prior to the date of application. 
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases 
Excli*d« ownership of beneficial interest in any 
land or account which is held in trust by the United 
States^ a state, or in a tribal account 
11. ]Per Capita Tribal Payments 
Exlude all per capita payments or any asset pur-
chased *"& per capita payments made to a tribal 
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribe. 
12. A ^ k a Native Claims Settlement Act — All 
Cases 
Exclude shares received as payment under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 
92-203)-
13. Income Producing Property — A 3 , and D 
Cases 
Exclude income producing property from assets 
when the individual's equity in the property does not 
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual 
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any 
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 percent 
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the 
entire equity amount. 
Net annual return: The income produced after 
subtracting mortgage payments or other payments 
necessary to generate income. 
14. fletroactive Social Security Benefits — All 
Cases 
ExeiAPt lump sum retroactive benefits received 
from tfte Social Security Administration (SSA and 
15. Student Benefits 
All Cases 
Do n°t count monies from certain sources to under-
graduate students as assets. These sources include: 
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships that 
have ftinds guaranteed by the U.S Commissioner of 
Education, including: 
_ pell Grants (Formerly BEOG) 
__ Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(SEOG) 
— Rational Direct Student Loans (NDSL) 
Guaranteed Student Loans 
— State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG) 
b. payments to participants of a service learning 
program such as College Work Study or University 
Year for Action (UYA). 
A, B, and D Cases 
Coxxpt any monies which remain after the school 
period covered from an educational grant, loan, or 
scholarship as an asset. 
16. f ension Funds — A, B and D Cases 
Do n°t count money held in a retirement fund un-
der a plan administered by an employer or union, an 
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh ac-
count owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A, B, 
a. Count as an asset any available money with-
drawn froui the pension starting the month after it is 
withdrawn* 
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) — All 
Cases 
Do pot count any asset, or the interest from the 
asset, which is held within the rules of the Uniform 
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any money from 
the asset given to the child as unearned income. 
Unifonn Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable gift of 
money °r property to a child under the age of 21. The 
gift cafl be made to only one child, with only one 
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form which 
includes a statement that the custodian holds the as-
set for the child under the Utah UGMA rules. 
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Medical 
or Social Services. 
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For A, B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments 
firom federal, state, or local government programs if 
the purpose of the payment is so the client can pay for 
medical or social services. This includes payments for 
vocational rehabilitation. Exclude these payments 
only for one calendar month following receipt. Do not 
confuse this exemption with reimbursements for 
medical or social services; money received as reim-
bursement must be counted as a resource the first 
month following receipt. 
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets. 
Spouses have a legal responsibility to financially 
support one another. Parents have a legal responsi-
bility to financially support their children until they 
are emancipated*. Because of this legal responsibil-
ity, assets firom a spouse or parent are counted as 
available to the eligible spouse or child. This process 
is called deeming. Because the asset is available, in-
clude it in the countable assets. 
419.1 Non-Nursing Home Cases 
Deem only from spouse to spouse or parent to un-
emancipated child. Deem only among people who bve 
together. 
.419.12 F and C Cases 
Do not deem from a parent or spouse who gets SSL 
#,419.2 Clients Who Are Residents of Medical Insti-
tutions 
%. Do not deem to a resident of a medical institution. 
However, there may be persons in medical institu-
tions who are not treated as medical institution cases. 
These cases will be set up using policy for clients who 
are* not residents of medical institutions: deeming 
may apply. Examples are: 
1. F or C Cases — Persons who are temporarily 
living apart firom their parents or children are not 
considered residents of medical institutions. 
2.~ All Cases — Persons are not considered resi-
dents for the month they enter the medical institu-
tion. 
419.3 All Cases 
Exemptions for deemed assets are applied based on 
the/type of asset (home, burial funds, tribal funds, 
certain lump sum payments etc.), and the category of 
assistance to which it is being applied. Emancipated: 
S*child is emancipated by: 
i£turning 18 years old, or 
2.1 getting married, or 
33 getting a court order which says that the child is 
emancipated^ 
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases. 
Remember that most lump sums count as income m 
the; month they are received. Count as an asset any 
balance which remains the month after receipt All 
SSA and SSI lump sums are exempt for 6 montlis 
after receipt. 
£{421.1 Lump Sum Received on Sales Contract 
p*l? Exempt lump sum payments received on a sales 
contract for the sale of an exempt home if the money 
isucpmmitted to replacement of the property solid 
within thirty days and the purchase is completed 
witjiin ninety days. 
Biaulf a period longer than ninety days is required \x> 
complete the actual purchase, the District Director 
ma&jgrant an extension in writing, using Form 689, 
PoJUcy> Decision. 
24If the property is not replaced within 90 days 
gad no extension has been granted, consider the total 
payment received as an asset 
£2L2 Proceeds Other Than or In Addition to a 
Lump Sum. 
1. Proceeds of a sales contract other than or in ad-
dition to a lump sum shall be exempt if applied to the 
purchase of replacement property. The same condi-
tions of time and commitment as for a lump sum ap-
ply (see Sec 421.1). 
2. If proceeds from the contract are not to be used 
to replace property, consider the balance remaining 
on the sales contract as an asset 
3. Availability (at any amount which would result 
in excess assets) is a factor. This means that if the 
balance remaining on a sales contract can be dis-
counted to an amount which (in conjunction with any 
other countable assets) exceeds the asset level, the 
client is ineligible. 
Example: 
Assume a single individual has no other countable 
assets, but has a balance remaining on a sales con-
tract of $5,000. We would ask a financial institution 
or other knowledgeable source if a market exists to 
assign the balance remaining to a buyer for the one-
person asset limit. If the market exists, then the bal-
ance remaining on the sales contract would make the 
client ineligible. 
421.3 Insurance Settlements for Destroyed Prop-
erty 
Exempt lump sum insurance payments for de-
stroyed property if the available money is used 
within ninety days to replace the destroyed property, 
and the destroyed property was exempt at the time of 
loss. 
1. The District Director may grant an extension 
beyond ninety days, using Form 689, Policy Decision. 
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property. 
425.1 F And C Cases 
When a client owns property and has the legal 
r.^ht tc 5ell it without interference, the
 r-v^*.,. ".<, 
available and we will count it in determining eligibil-
ity. 
425.2 A. B and D Cases 
1. Exempt income producing property when: 
a. The equity in the property is less than $6,000 
and 
b. The property produces a net annual return of at 
least 6 percent of the equity. 
Equity value more than $6,000 counts as an asset 
only if the 6 percent net annual return is met. If it is 
not, then the entire equity amount shall count. 
2. If the client has the legal right to sell his share 
of the property, and if such equity is includable as an 
asset, and this results in the asset level being ex-
ceeded, close the case or deny the application. 
3. The actual availability (whether a market exists 
to sell the property) is not a factor in counting the 
property as an asset. 
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets. 
431.1 F and C Medicaid 
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset. 
431.2 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are 
Not Residents of Medical Institutions. 
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset if the 
client is not a resident of a medical institution. 
431.3 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are 
Residents of Medical Institutions 
431.31 Apply no sanction for the transfer of the 
following assets^ 
1. If the property was transferred prior to July 1, 
1988 and the property was transferred more than 24 
months prior to the date of application. Also, apply no 
sanction for the transfer of an asset which would have 
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been exempt by Medicaid rules in effect at the time of 
the transfer. 
2. If the property was transferred on or after July 
1, 1988 and the property was transferred more than 
30 months prior to the date of application. Also apply 
no sanction in the following situations: 
a. Transfer of a home to a spouse 
b. Transfer of any resource to a spouse or for the 
sole benefit of a spouse 
c. Transfer of a home or other resource to a child 
under age 18 who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled 
d. Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an eq-
uity interest in the home and who has lived in the 
home for at least 1 year immediately preceding the 
client's entry into a medical institution 
e. Transfer of a home to a son or daughter who has 
lived in the home and cared for the client for at least 
two years prior to the individual's entry into the med-
ical institution. 
431.21 Undue Hardship 
Apply no sanction for transfer of assets if the sanc-
tion would be an undue hardship on the client. An 
undue hardship exists when: 
1. The client has exhausted all reasonable legal 
means to regain possession of the asset transfarred. It 
is not reasonable to require the client to take action if 
a knowledgeable source (such as the client's lawyer or 
financial institution) confirms that it is doubtful 
those efforts will succeed. That knowledgeable source 
must specify the reasons for that decision. The 
worker or supervisor must agree that it is doubtful 
those efforts will succeed, iw oncers may contact the 
State Office of Assistance Payments for advise or as-
sistance if needed.) It is not reasonable to require the 
client to take action more costly than the value of the 
asset, and 
2. Either V or "b" below 
a. Without Medicaid, the client will not be able to 
enter a nursing home and the client is at risk of death 
or permanent disability if not admitted to a nursing 
home. This must be verified by a physician's state-
ment. 
b. This household cannot afford to meet the client's 
medical needs at home. The client must verify that 
the cost of medical care (including diapers and special 
foods) added to normal living costs, exceeds household 
income. Do not count medical costs that are covered 
by insurance. If the client is eligible for Medicaid, do 
not count medical costs covered by Medicaid but 
count any spenddown required. 
431.33 Rebuttal of Presumption the Resource Was 
Transferred to Become Eligible for Medicaid 
Presume that any transfer of assets at less than 
current market value is for the purpose of meeting 
asset limitations. It is the client's responsibility to 
provide evidence that a transfer was made for exclu-
sively another purpose. Apply no sanction if the cli-
ent verifies this. 
431.34 How to Apply the Sanction 
1. Determine if the current market value* (at the 
time of the transfer) was received. Form 421 may be 
used to contact a knowledgeable source to aid in this 
decision. Do not consider the services of or assistance 
of a family member in exchange for property unless a 
contract existed prior to the receipt of the service. 
2. If the asset transfer occurred after July 1,1988, 
the period of ineligibility begins with the month in 
which the resources were transferred. The client is 
ineligible for the less of: 
a. 30 months, or 
b. The number of months resulting from dividing 
the total uncompensated value* by the average pri-
vate-pay rate for nursing homes. This is $1,365. 
Current Market Value: A fair and reasonable com-
pensation (in money or other worth) for property as 
established by current standards of appraisal. Un-
compensated Value: The difference between the cur-
rent market value of property and the lesser compen-
sation received as a result of the transfer. When an 
asset was jointly owned the uncompensated value is 
the difference between the individuals shares of the 
current market value and the compensation received. 
3. If the asset transfer occurred before July 1, 
1988, add the uncompensated value to all other 
countable assets for a maximum of 24 months from 
the date of transfer. The household is ineligible as 
long as the asset level is exceeded. Uncompensated 
value may be reduced as follows: 
a. During months not eligible for Medicaid — re-
duce uncompensated value by incurred expenses as* 
listed in Section 309.31. 
b. During months eligible for Medicaid — reduce 
uncompensated value by any spenddown paid and 
any incurred expenses as listed in Section 309.32. 
431.5 Determination of Current Market Value in 
Transfer of Property 
To determine whether property was transferred for 
Current Market Value, add to the amount received 
by the seller any debts against the property. 
To determine the proceeds from the transfer of 
property, subtract from the sale price any unsatisfied 
mortgage, any burial expense paid within the prior 3 
months, and anv medical expense paid within the 
prior 6 months. ^ 
431.6 Life Estates as Assets 
A, B and D Medicaid 
When an applicant/recipient transfers property to 
another party and retains a life estate* interest, con-
sider the transfer according to the policy require-
ments for transfer of assets. 
If the transfer of assets provisions are met, proceed 
as follows: 
1. Determine the current market value of the prop-
erty by contacting a knowledgeable source which in-
clude: 
a. Real Estate brokers. 
b. The local office of the Farmer's Home Adminis-
tration (for rural land). 
c The local office for the Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service (for rural land). 
d. Banks, savings and loan associations, mortgage 
companies, and similar lending institutions. 
2. Use Table VI. 
3. Find the claimant's age as of last birthday. 
4. Multiply the figure in the life estate column for 
that age by the current market value of the property 
to determine the value of the life estate. 
5. If the value of the life estate in conjunction with 
any other countable assets exceeds the allowable as-
set level, close the case or deny the application. 
a. Count the value of the life estate even if no mar-
ket exists to sell it. 
6. If the client refutes the above amount, use the 
new amount as verified. 
F and C Cases 
Do not consider the life estate interest as an avail 
able asset. However, count any income produced by 
the life estate. 
Life estate: a life estate conveys upon an individual 
or individuals for his lifetime certain rights in prop-, 
erty. The owner of a life estate has the right of posses-
sion, the right to use the property, the right to sell his * 
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life estate interest. He does not have title to the prop-
erty and he does not have the right to sell the prop-
erty itself. 
B810-304-44L Third Party Liability (TPL) — All 
Cases. 
Applicants for medical assistance must, as a condi-
tion of eligibility, cooperate in the completion of the 
Third Party Liability Questionnaire. Recipients of 
medical assistance must report any changes in third 
party liability and they must cooperate in the estab-
lishment and collection of third party claims. This 
includes cooperating in the establishment of pater-
nity so third party claims can be established against 
the absent parents. 
441.1 Changes in TPL Information 
The recipient must report changes in TPL informa-
tion no later than 30 days after the change. To do 
this, the recipient may use the Form 61-B, a monthly 
report form, or another method such as a phone call. 
When the district receives a report of a change in 
TPL information, the district worker must complete a 
new TPL Questionnaire and send it to the cost avoid-
ance unit. If the district receives the report more than 
30 days after the change in TPL, make a note of this 
on the TPL questionnaire that is sent to the Cost 
Avoidance Unit (CAU) at ORS. 
In addition, whenever the District Office receives 
information indicating possible TPL arising from 
negligence of others, such as automobile accidents, 
public liabilities, homeowner's accidents, etc, ORS 
should be notified by memo of the following: 
a. Recipient name and case number 
b. Date of the accident 
c Nature of the accident 
d. Any other pertinent information, such as the 
company involved, policy holder, and court informa-
tion. 
Remember that money received from a TPL source 
is not to be counted as income against medical liabil-
ity. 
Third Party Liability: An individual, institution, cor-
poration, public or private agency that is responsible 
or may be responsible to pay all or part of the medical 
cost of injury, disease, or disability of an applicant or 
recipient. Examples of third party liability include 
health, accident, and hospital insurances; liability in-
surance such as auto and homeowner's policies; in-
dustrial accident claims; court judgments, and rights 
to medical support a child might have from an absent 
Went. 
441.2 Sanctions for Noncooperation 
Noncooperation is refusing to complete the TPL 
form or withholding TPL information that is avail-
able to the client. 
If a person provides all the TPL information of 
which he is aware but doesn't know every detail, this 
is cooperation. If a third party, such as an ex-spouse, 
refuses to tell the client about insurance information, 
this is cooperation. 
Only the CAU in Recovery Services will have the 
responsibility for determining noncooperation. If the 
client has good cause for noncooperation*, impose no 
sanction. 
If the CAU determines that a client is not coopera-
ting, it will notify the district office. After providing 
the 10-day advance notice, withhold medical assis-
tance only for the individual who refused to cooper-
ate. 
The CAU will notify the district office when the 
client begins cooperating. Restore medical coverage 
for the full month in which notice of cooperation is 
received. 
Good Cause for Noncooperation: Good Cause for non-
cooperation includes the reasonable anticipation of 
physical or emotional harm to the applicant, recipi-
ent, or children. 
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The 
Assets of Sponsors — All Cases. 
Certain aliens who have been legally admitted in 
the United States for permanent residence must have 
the resources of their sponsors considered in deter-
mining eligibility for medical assistance. 
443.1 Aliens Who are Not Subject to This Require-
ment 
Aliens who are not subject to this requirement are 
those who are: 
1. Paroled in the US as refugees 
2. Granted Political Asylum 
3. Admitted as Cuban/Haitian entrants 
4. Other conditional or paroled entrants 
5. Not sponsored or who have sponsors that are 
organizations or institutions 
6. Sponsored by persons who receive medicaid, 
AFDC or SSI 
7. The dependent child of the sponsor 
8. The sponsor's stepchild 
There are some permanent resident aliens who 
have I-151's or 1-551 (or "green cards") and who were 
admitted to this country as refugees. These people are 
not subject to this requirement. 
443.2 Aliens Who are Subject to this Requirement 
Aliens who apply for medical assistance after April 
1, 1983 and who have been legally admitted into the 
US for permanent residence are subject to this re-
quirement. They are subject to this for 3 years after 
their "entry" date into the United States. This entry 
date has been defined as the date established by INS 
as the date the alien was admitted for permanent 
residence. Time spent in the U.S. under other than 
permanent residence is not considered as part of the 3 
year period. 
Sponsor: any person who has completed an affidavit 
or other similar agreement with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) on behalf of an alien as 
a condition of the alien's entry into the US for perma-
nent residence. 
Aliens who are subject to this requirement will 
have either an INS Form 1-151 or INS Form 1-551. 
443.3 Reporting Assets of Sponsors 
1. The sponsor's assets must be reported each 
month. The report must include a written statement 
of the sponsor's assets. The statement must be signed 
by the sponsor. 
2. The sponsor's statement must be received by the 
17th of the month or the alien's case must be closed. 
443.4 Countable Assets of Sponsors 
To determine how much of the sponsor's assets to 
count in determining eligibility for the alien, follow 
these steps 
1. Apply the medical assistance policies (see sec-
tion 400) to the assets of the sponsor and the sponsor's 
spouse. 
2. Subtract $1,500 from the countable assets of the 
sponsor and sponsor's spouse. 
3. Count the remaining asset value in determining 
the alien's eligibility. 
443.5 Multiple Sponsorships 
1. When a person sponsors two or more alien fami-
lies living together, the countable assets of the spon-
sor will be divided equally among the aliens. 
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2. When a person sponsors two or more alien fami-
lies who do not live together, the countable assets per 
family will depend on the number of alien families 
who receive medical assistance. 
Example: a person sponsors four alien families, but 
only one is eligible for medical assistance, the total 
countable assets will count against that one alien 
family. 
Example: a person sponsors four alien families and 
three of them are eligible for medical assistance, the 
total countable assets would be divided equally 
among the three eligible alien families. 
443.6 Revocation of Sponsor Agreements 
Do not waive these requirements even if the spon-
sor claims to have revoked his sponsorship agree-
ment. 
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions. 
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institu-
tion. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a 
medical institution. 
461.1 For an Emancipated Child 
When a child is emancipated*, count only his as-
sets. 
461.2 For an Unemancipated Child 
1. Count the income and assets of a child's parents 
when the child lives with his parents. 
For B and D cases, a child is considered living with 
his parent until the month after he moves. 
For F and C cases, a child is considered living with 
his parents while temporarily absent from the home, 
for school, vacation, summer employment, 
medical treatment, etc. One exception to this rule is a 
child in the custody of a State agency, such as a 
Youth Corrections detention center or Utah State 
Training School. The court order will say that the 
child is in the custody of the State. 
2. Count only the assets of the child when: 
F and C cases — when the child is living away from 
his parents and it is not temporary. 
a. This includes a child receiving Title IV-E Foster 
Care assistance, no matter where he lives. 
b. This includes a child in foster care who has not 
been placed back in his own home (See Sec. 213.5) 
The only exceptions to this are (1) a child voluntarily 
placed in foster care and who is not eligible for Title 
IV-E Foster Care assistance and (2) a child in the 
custody of a state agency. In these cases, the parents, 
income and assets must be counted because they have 
signed an agreement to provide medical care for the 
child. 
c. This includes a child living with a specified rela-
tive if it is not temporary. 
Emancipated: A child becomes emancipated by: 
1. Turning_18 years old. 
2. Getting married. 
3. Obtaining a court order that specifically states 
the child is emancipated. 
d. This includes a child temporarily placed in an 
institution if the state is responsible for the care and 
control of that child. The state is responsible for con-
trol and care of the child if a court order places the 
child in the custody of the state. The state is also 
responsible for the child if the parents have voluntar-
ily relinquished parental rights. 
461.3 Countable Assets for a Spouse 
Count the assets of a spouse as available to his 
spouse while the couple lives together. 
For A, B, and D, Cases 
If a couple separates, and if each spouse gets Medi-
caid, count the assets of the spouse as available for 6 
months following the separation. If they get divorced 
in the 6 months, quit counting the assets. 
If a couple separates, and if only one spouse gets 
Medicaid, quit counting the assets of the ineligible 
spouse starting the month after they separate. 
For F and C Cases 
* If a couple separates, and the separation is not tem-
porary, count only the assets of the eligible spouse. 
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions. 
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institu-
tion. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a 
medical institution. 
Remember that when a person who owns a home 
becomes a resident of a medical institution, the home 
becomes countable unless: 
1. The person's stay in the medical institution will 
be short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says 
that the client is likely to return home within 6. 
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution 
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or 
2. The person states that he intends to return 
home. It does not matter whether the person actually 
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit 
to his exemption. The statement of intent must be in 
writing from the client or his representative, or 
3. The person's spouse or dependent children or a 
relative* who still live in the home. 
465.1 A, B or D Cases 
Count only the assets of the client. Compare them 
to the asset level for one person. 
465.2 Assets fcr « Chi!** w>»o jc
 a Member of an 
AFDC Household — F Cases 
When the child is expected to return to the AFDC 
household, continue him as an additional on that 
case. 
When the child is not expected to return to an 
AFDC household consider another category of cover-
age for him. 
465.3 Assets for a Parent Who is a Member of an 
AFDC Household — F Cases 
When the parent is expected to return to the AFDC 
household, continue him as an additional or as the 
payee on that case. 
If the parent is not expected to return to the AFDC 
household, he is not eligible for F category. Consider 
another category of coverage. 
Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, step-
mother, stepfather, half sister, half brother, niece, 
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sis-
ter, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
465.4 Assets for a Child Who is Not a Member of a 
F Category Household — C Cases 
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institu-
tion. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a 
medical institution. 
If the child can be expected to return home, he is 
still considered part of the C case. Do not treat the 
child as a resident of a medical institution. Treat the 
entire household as a case involving clients who are 
not residents of a medical institution. 
If the child is not expected to return home, do not 
consider him a resident of a medical institution for 
the month he leaves home. For following months, 
count only the child's assets. 
465.5 Assets for a Foster Care Child Who is a — F 
or C Cases 
Count only the child's assets. Compare them to the 
asset level for a one person. 
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465.6 Accumulated Assets of Residents of Medical 
Institutions — All Categories 
I.: If a resident of a medical institution accumu-
lates assets in excess of the asset limit, close the case 
i if costs of the medical institution are to be paid 
,_J these monies. However, do not count as an asset 
^deposit to savings or checking accounts in the 
r month that you count the deposit as income. 
^During eligibility determinations and reviews 
*' *"" i personal need accounts. Add any amount in 
excess of $30 to other countable assets. 
;i*8T^' 26-18 
R810-305. Medicaid: Program Benefits. 
R810-305-503. Basic Maintenance Standard. 
R810-305-507. Medical Identification Card. 
R810-305-511. Date of Entitlement. 
R810-305-521. Availability of Medical Services. 
R810-305-561. Burial Allowance. 
R810-305-503. Basic Maintenance Standard. 
f rhe Basic Maintenance Standard shown on Table Grants, is the base to which countable income is 
compared to determine if a household has excess in-
come. 
R810-305-507. Medical Identification Card. 
tfExcept for recipients of the Indigent Medical Pro-
gram, an identification card shall be issued each 
nftiith listing the eligible members of the household 
Sryl indicating any additional medical insurance cov-
erage^  available to them which might limit the r<*-
ropnsibility of the State for payment for the services. 
E&To obtain medical services, the individual miu;t 
present this identification card to the medical pro-
vider, of his choice. 
ZgA^A medical identification card shall only be com-
pter printed. 
|g)7.1 Interim Medical Eligibility 
aedical services are needed by an approved a]> 
at before a computer-issued identification card is 
lived, the District Office shall use Form 695, In-
Verification of Medical Eligibility, to inform 
^medical provider of the claim procedure. 
810-305-511. Date of Entitlement 
^Assistance shall be effective from the first of the 
atKjrf application if the case is determined to have 
^eligible at any time during the month. However, 
w£Bvior D Medicaid, when assets held on the first 
Jggaicalendar month exceed allowable limits, the 
old is ineligible for the entire month. 
I^f the District Assistance Payments Office deter-
_ _ s during the verification process that the appli-
c^n^ras ineligible on the date of application but 
jSger^ in the month, became eligible, assistance shall 
gegin on the first day of the month the application 
;made. 
^If a newborn child is a member of an AFDC £i-
ggnclal assistance household, then add him to the 
&&nt, after verification requirements are completed, 
|||9Ctive the date the Birth is reported to the District 
EffS? However, the child is eligible for medical cov-
^effective the date of the birth. 
Retroactive Medical Assistance 
aent of past medical expenses is requested 
ive medical assistance may be approved if the 
conditions are met: 
Medical expense must have been incurred 
Lier than the first day of the third month prior 
month of application. 
2. Individuals not eligible during the month of ap-
plication may still be eligible for any or all of the 
retroactive months. 
3. The household must be determined to have been 
eligible the month the expenses were incurred. 
4. The excess income amount shall be determined 
for each requested retroactive month in which a ser-
vice was provided which cost exceeds the excess in-
come for the same month. 
5. The excess amount for any eligible retroactive 
month must be paid before any medical benefit may 
be approved. The applicant pays only for those 
months he wishes to be covered. 
6. For AFDC-PG, do not allow retroactive coverage 
for the 2 months of eligibility following the termina-
tion of the pregnancy. This coverage is allowed only 
when the client received Medicaid at the time the 
pregnancy terminated. 
511.2 Retroactive Assistance for Clients in Medical 
Institutions 
Use the same procedure to determine eligibility 
and any excess income for a patient in a medical in-
stitution as for any other applicant. For retroactive 
Medicaid after October 1, 1988, the client must pass 
the Gross Test for coverage of nursing homes, Utah 
State Hospital, or Utah State Training School. (See 
Sec. 361.1) 
511.3 Nursing Home Date of Eligibility 
Although the date of medical eligibility is estab-
lished in the district office, it is only part of the pro-
cess necessary to pay a nursing home. The date of 
medical eligibility (always the first of a month) can 
be different from the date of eligibility for payment. 
This is because the nursing home stay needs to be 
authorized as medically necessary. This is done by 
the Bureau of Patient Assessment in the Division of 
Health Care Financing. HCFA Form 10 (Preadmis-
sion Document i^ia continued ot&y Transmittal) is 
used for this purpose. Since Health Care Financing 
will not pay the nursing home for coverage prior to 
the date on the Form 10, this may be a different date 
than the first of a month. 
Tell the client or his representative that this two 
part eligibility exists, so that when a 228C is re-
ceived, it is not mistaken for the only factor which 
influences payment to the nursing home. 
R810-305-521. Availability of Medical Services. 
An individual may seek medical care anywhere 
within the State; however, the individual is encour-
aged to seek the nearest available medical care. 
521.1 Out-of-State Medical Services 
1. Requests for out-of-state medical services must 
be made to the State Assistance Payments Office for 
prior approval through the Division of Health Care 
Financing. 
2. There are 4 areas in Utah where medical ser-
vices may be obtained out-of-state with out prior ap-
proval. 
a. Rich County residents may go to Evanston, Wy-
oming; Riverton, Wyoming; Preston, Idaho; Paris, 
Idaho; or Montpelier, Idaho. 
b. San Juan County residents may go to Cortez, 
Del Norte, Dolores, Durango, Grand Junction and 
Montrose, Colorado; or to Shiprock or Fannington, 
New Mexico. 
c. Residents of the Snake Valley area in Millard 
County (Garrison; Gandy, Burbank and Eakdale) 
may go to Ely, Nevada and East Ely, Nevada. 
d. Residents of Grand County may go to Grand 
Junction, Colorado. 
Note: Long term care can be provided only in Utah. 
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§ 1382b. Resources 
(a) Exclusions from resources. In determining the resources of an mdiud-
ual (and his eligible spouse, if any) there shall be excluded— 
(1) the home (including the land that appertains thereto); 
(2)(A) household goods, personal effects, and an automobile, to the 
extent that their total value does not exceed such amount as the 
Secretary determines to be reasonable; and 
(B) the value of any burial space (subject to such limits as to size or 
value as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe) held for the 
purpose of providing a place for the burial of the individual, his 
spouse, or any other member of his immediate family; 
(3) other property which, as determined in accordance with and subject 
to limitations prescribed by the Secretary, is so essential to the means of 
self-support of such individual (and such spouse) as to warrant its 
exclusion; 
(4) such resources of an individual who is blind or disabled and who has 
a plan for achieving self-support approved by the Secretary, as may be 
necessary for the fulfillment of such plan; 
(5) in the case of Natives of Alaska, shares of stock held in a Regional 
or a Village Corporation, during the period of twenty years in which 
such stock is inalienable, as provided in section 7(h) and section 8(c) of 
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the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [43 USCS §§ 1606(h), 
1607(c)]; 
(6) assistance referred to in section 1612(b)(ll) [42 USCS 
§ 1382a(b)(ll)] for the 9-month period beginning on the date such funds 
are received (or for such longer period as the Secretary shall by 
regulations prescribe in cases where good cause is shown by the 
individual concerned for extending such period); and, for purposes of 
this paragraph, the term "assistance" includes interest thereon which is 
excluded from income under section 1612(b)(12) [42 USCS 
§ 1382a(b)(12)]; and 
(7) any amount received from the United States which is attributable to 
under payments of benefits due for one or more prior months, under this 
title [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.] or title II [42 USCS §§401 et seq.] to 
such individual (or spouse) or to any other person whose income is 
deemed to be included in such individual's (or spouse's) income for 
purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.] but the application of 
this paragraph in the case of any such individual (and eligible spouse if 
any), with respect to any amount so received from the United States, 
shall be limited to the first 6 months following the month in which such 
amount is received, and written notice of this limitation shall be given to 
the recipient concurrently with the payment of such amount. 
In determining the resources of an individual (or eligible spouse) an 
insurance policy shall be taken into account only to the extent of its cash 
surrender value; except that if the total face value of all life insurance 
policies on any person is 51,500 or less, no pan of the value of any such 
pohc\ shall be taken into account 
Cb) Disposition of resources. The Secretary shall prescribe the period or 
periods of time within which, and the manner in which, various kinds of 
property must be disposed of in order not to be included in determining an 
individual's eligibility for benefits. Any portion of the individual's benefits 
paid for any such period shall be conditioned upon such disposal; and any 
benefits so paid shall (at the time of the disposal) be considered overpay-
ments to the extent they would not have been paid had the disposal 
occurred at the beginning of the period for which such benefits were paid. 
(c) Resources disposed of for less than fair market value. (1) In determin-
ing the resources of an individual (and his eligible spouse, if any) there 
shall be included (but subject to the exclusions under subsection (a)) any 
resource (or interest therein) owned by such individual or eligible spouse 
within the preceding 24 months if such individual or eligible-spouse gave 
away or sold such resource or interest at less than fair market value of 
such resource or interest for the purpose of establishing eligibility for 
benefits or assistance under this Act. 
(2) Any transaction described in paragraph (1) shall be presumed to 
have b.een for the purpose of establishing eligibility for benefits or 
assistance under this Act unless such individual or eligible spouse 
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furnishes convincing evidence to establish that the transaction was 
exclusively for some other purpose. 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (1) the value of such a resource or 
interest shall be the fair market value of such resource or interest at the 
time it was sold or given away, less the amount of compensation 
received for such resource or interest, if any. 
(d) Funds set aside for burial expenses. (1) In determining the resources of 
an individual, there shall be excluded an amount, not in excess of S 1,500 
each with respect to such individual and his spouse (if any), that is 
separately identifiable and has been set aside to meet the burial and 
related expenses of such individual or spouse if the inclusion of any 
portion of such amount or amounts would cause the resources of such 
individual, or of such individual and spouse, to exceed the limits 
specified in paragraph (1) or (2) (whichever may be applicable) of 
section 1611(a) [42 USCS § 1382(a)(1), (2)]. 
(2) The amount of $1,500, referred to in paragraph (1), with respect to 
an individual shall be reduced by an amount equal to (A) the total face 
value of all insurance policies on his life which are owned by him or his 
spouse and the cash surrender value of which has been excluded in 
determining the resources of such individual or of such individual and 
his spouse, and (B) the total of any amounts in an irrevocable trust (or 
cincr irrevocable arrangement) available to meet the burial and related 
expenses of such individual or his spouse. 
(3) If the Secretary finds that any part of the amount excluded under 
paragraph (1) was used for purposes other than those for which it was 
set aside, he shall reduce any future benefits payable to the eligible 
individual (or to such individual and his spouse) by an amount equal to 
such part. 
(4) The Secretary may provide by regulations that whenever an amount 
set aside to meet burial and related expenses is excluded under para-
graph (1) in determining the resources of an individual, any interest 
earned or accrued on such amount (and left to accumulate), and any 
appreciation in the value of prepaid burial arrangements for which such 
amount was set aside, shall also be excluded (to such extent and subject 
to such conditions or limitations as such regulations may prescribe) in 
determining the resources (and the income) of such individual. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XVI, Part A, § 1613, as added Oct. 30, 1972, 
P. L. 92-603, Title III, §301, 86 Stat. 1470.; Oct. 20, 1976, P. L. 94-569, 
§ 5, 90 Stat. 2700; Nov. 12, 1977, P. L. 95-171, § 9(a), 91 Stat. 1355; Dec. 
28, 1980, P. L. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat. 3567; Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248, 
Title I, Subtitle F, § 185(a), (b), 96 Stat. 406; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, 
Division B, Title VI, Subtitle B, Pan 1, § 2614, 98 Stat. 1132.) 
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§ 1382b. Resources 
(a) Exclusions from resources. {Introductoo' matter unchanged] 
(1) [Unchanged) 
(2XA) [Unchanged | 
(B) the value of any burial space or agreement (including any interest accumulated thereon) 
representing the purchase of a burial space (subject to such limits as to size or value as the 
Secretary may by regulation prescribe) held for the purpose of providing a place for the burial of 
the individual, his spouse, or any other member of his immediate family; 
(3) other propcny which is so essential to the means of self-support of such individual (and such 
spouse) as to warrant its exclusion, as determined in accordance with and subject to limitations 
prescribed by the Secretary, except that the Secretary shall not establish a limitation on property 
(including the tools of a tradesperson and the machinery and livestock of a farmer) that is used in a 
4rade or business or by such individual as an employee. 
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(4), (5) (Unchanged] 
(6) assistance referred to in section 1612(bXH) (42 USCS § 1382a(bXU)) for the 9-month period 
beginning on the date such funds are received (or for such longer period as the Secretary shall by 
regulations prescribe in cases where good cause is shown by the individual concerned for extending 
such period); and, for purposes of this paragraph, the term "assistance" includes interest thereon 
which is excluded from income under section l612(bX12) [42 USCS § 1382a(bX12)]; 
(7) any amount received from the United States which n attributable to under payments of benefits 
due for one or more prior months, under this title [42 USCS §$1381 et seq.] or title II [42 USCS 
§§401 et seq.] to such individual (or spouse) or to any other person whose income is deemed to be 
included in such individual's (or spouse's) income for purposes of this title [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.] 
but the application of this paragraph in the case of any such individual (and eligible spouse if any), 
with respect to any amount so received from the United States, shall be limited to the first 6 months 
following the month in which such amount is received (or to the first 9 months following such month 
with respect to any amount so received during the period beginning October 1, 1987, and ending 
September 30, 1989),.and written notice of this limitation shall be given to the recipient concurrently 
with the payment of such amount; 
(8) the value of assistance referred to in section 16l2(bXM) [42 USCS § l382a(bXM)]. paid with 
respect to the dwelling unit occupied by such individual (or such individual and spouse); 
(9) for the 9-month period beginning after the month in which received, any amount received by such 
individual (or such spouse) from a fund established by a State to aid victims of crime, to the extent 
that such individual (or such spouse) demonstrates that such amount was paid as compensation for 
expenses incurred or losses suffered as a result of a crime; and 
(10) for the 9-month period beginning after the month in which received, relocation assistance 
provided by a State or local government to such individual (or such spouse), comparable to assistance 
provided under title II of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies 
Act of 1970 which is subject to the treatment required by section 216 of such Act [42 USCS § 4636] 
[(11)](10) for the month of receipt and the following month, any refund of Federal income taxes 
made to such individual (or such spouse) by reason of section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 [26 USCS §32] (relating to earned income tax credit), and any payment made to such 
individual (or such spouse) by an employer under section 3507 of such Code (26 USCS § 3507] 
(relating to advance payment of earned income credit). 
[Concluding matter unchanged] 
(b) Disposition of resources. (1) The Secretary shall prescribe the period or periods of time within which, 
and the manner in which, various lands of property must be disposed of in order not to be included 
in determining an individual's eligibility for benefits. Any portion of the individual's benefits paid for 
- "j such period shall be conditioned upon such dicpesti; and any bc .J:~ .:. -v.£ shill \ul the lime of 
the disposal) be considered overpayments to the extent they would not have been paid had the 
disposal occurred at the beginning of the period for which such benefits were paid. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall not require the disposition of 
any real property for so long as it cannot be sold because (A) it is jointly owned (and its sale would 
cause undue hardship, due to loss of housing, for the other owner or owners), (B) its sale is barred by 
a legal impediment, or ( Q as determined under* regulations issued by the Secretary, the owner's 
reasonable efforts to sell it have been unsuccessful. 
(c) Notification of Medicaid policy restricting eligibility of institutionalized individuals for benefits based 
on disposal of resources for less than fair market value. (1) At the time an individual (and the 
individual's eligible spouse, if any) applies for benefits under this title, and at the time the eligibility of 
an individual (and such spouse, if any) for such benefits is redetermined, the Secretary shall— 
(A) inform such individual of the provisions of section 1917(c) [42 USCS § 1396p(c)] providing 
for a period of ineligibility for benefits under title XIX for individuals who make certain 
dispositions of resources for less than fair market value, and inform such individual that 
information obtained pursuant to subparagraph (B) will be made available to the State agency 
administering a State plan under title XIX (as provided in paragraph (2)); and 
(B) obtain from such individual information which may be used by the State agency in 
determining whether or not a period of ineligibility for such benefits would be required by reason 
of section 1917(c) [42 USCS § 1396p(c)] if such individual (or such spouse, if any) enters a 
medical institution or nursing facility. 
(2) The Secretary shall make the information obtained under paragraph (1KB) available, on request, 
to any State agency administering a State plan approved under title XIX. 
(d) Funds set aside for burial expenses. (I) In determining the resources of an individual, there shall be 
excluded an amount, not in excess of $1,500 each with respect to such individual and his spouse (if 
any), that is separately identifiable and has been set aside to meet the burial and related expenses of 
__such individual or spouse. 
(2) [Unchanged] 
(3) If the Secretary finds that any part of the amount excluded under paragraph (1) was used for 
purposes other than those for which it was set aside in cases where the inclusion of any portion of the 
amount would cause the resources of such individual, or of such individual and spouse, to exceed the 
limits specified in paragraph (1) or (2) (whichever may be applicable) of section 1611(a) [42 USCS 
§ 1382(aXO or (2)], he shall reduce any future benefits payable to the eligible individual (or to such 
individual and his spouse) by an amount equal to such part 
(4) [Unchanged] 
(As amended Dec. 22. 1987, P. L. 100-203, Title IX Subtitle B, Part 1, §§ 9103(a). 9104(a), 9105(a). 
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TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522: 12 USCS 
§§1715w, 1715Z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108; 42 USCS 
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5. 
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, 130S, 1309, 
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a-
7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4, 1320b-5, 1320c-2, 1320c-10, 1382, 
13S2g; I38?h, 13821, i?83c, !?95b-l, 1395v, 1395x, 1395y, 1395z. 1595cc. 
1395mm, 1395H, 1395w, 1395w\v, 1997, 3013, 3026, 3035b, 8624. 
§ 1396. Appropriations 
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the 
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of 
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individu-
als, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help 
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or 
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year 
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making 
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the 
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, P. L. 
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343; Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233, 
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B, Title VI, 
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.) 
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance 
(a) Contents. A State plan for medical assistance must— 
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them; 
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to not less than 
40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the 
plan with respect to which payments under section 1903 [42 USCS 
§ 1396b] are authorized by this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]; and, 
effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State 
equal to all of such non-Federal share or provide for distribution of 
funds from Federal or State sources, for carrying out the State plan, on 
an equalization or other basis which will assure that the lack of 
adequate funds from local sources will not result in lowering the 
amount, duration, scope, or quality of care and services available under 
the plan; 
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the 
State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under 
the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness; 
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including methods 
relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on 
a merit basis, except that the Secretary shall exercise no authority with 
respect to the selection, tenuis of office, and compensation of any 
individual employed in accordance with such methods, and including 
provision for utilization of professional medical personnel in the admin-
istration and, where administered locally, supervision of administration 
of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper 
and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for the training and effective use 
of paid subprofessional staff, with particular emphasis on the full-time or 
part-time employment of recipients and other persons of low income, as 
community service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the 
use of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service volunteer 
program in providing services to applicants and recipients and in 
assisting any advisory committees established by the State agency, and 
(C) that each State or local officer or employee who is responsible for 
• the expenditure of substantial amounts of funds under the State plan, 
each individual who formerly was such an officer or employee, and each 
partner of such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from commit-
ting any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the commission 
of which, in connection with any activity concerning the United States 
Government, by an officer or employee of the United States Govern-
ment, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a partner of 
such an officer or employee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of title 
18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 207, 208]; 
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State 
agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan; or 
provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to 
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administer or to supervise the administration of the plan, except that the 
determination of eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be 
made by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved 
under title I or XVI [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1381 et seq.] (insofar as it 
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the State plan 
program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.], or by 
the agency or agencies administering the supplemental security income 
program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.] or the 
State Plan approved under part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 601 et seq.] if 
the State is not eligible to participate in the State plan program 
established under title XVI; [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.] 
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form 
and containing such information, as the Secretary may from time to 
time require, and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may 
from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verifica-
tion of such reports; 
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information 
concerning applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with 
the administration of the plan; 
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical 
assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such 
assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible 
individuals; 
(9) provide— 
(A) chat the State nealtn agency, or other appropriate State medical 
agency (whichever is utilized by the Secretary for the purpose speci-
fied in the first sentence of section 1864(a) [42 USCS § 1395aa(a)]), 
shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining health standards 
for private or public institutions in which recipients of medical 
assistance under the plan may receive care or services, 
(B) for the establishment or designation of a State authority or 
authorities which shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining 
standards, other than those relating to health, for such institutions, 
and 
(C) that any laboratory services paid for under such plan must be 
provided by a laboratory which meets the applicable requirements, of 
section 1861(e)(9) or paragraphs (11) and (12) of section 1861(s) [42 
USCS § 1395x(e)(9), (s)(ll), (12)], or, in the case of a laboratory 
which is in a rural health clinic, of section 1861(aa)(2)(G) [42 USCS 
§ 1395x(aa)(2)(G)]; 
(10) provide— 
(A) for making~~medical assistance available, including at least the 
care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) and (17) of 
section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(l)-(5), (17)], to— 
(i) all individuals— 
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(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the 
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A or part 
E of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 
1381 et seq., 601 et seq. 670 et seq.] (including individuals 
eligible under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] by reason of 
section 402(a)(37) or 406(h) [42 USCS § 602(a)(37), 606(h)], or 
considered by the State to be receiving such aid as authorized 
under section 414(g) [42 USCS § 614(g)]), 
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits 
are being paid under title XVI [42 USCS § 1381 et seq.], or 
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or children as defined in 
section 1905(n) [42 USCS § 1396d(n)]; 
(ii) at the option of the State, to any group or groups of individuals 
described in section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)] (or, in the case 
of individuals described in section 1905(a)(i) [42 USCS 
§ 1396d(a)(l)], to any reasonable categories of such individuals) 
who are not individuals described in clause (i) of this subparagraph 
but— 
(I) who meet the income and resources requirements of the 
appropriate State plan described in clause (i) or the supplemental 
security income program (as the case may be), 
(II) who would meet the income and resources requirements of 
the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) if their work-
related child care costs were paid from their earnings rather than 
by a State agency as a service expenditure, 
(III) who would be eligible to receive aid under the appropriate 
State plan described in clause (i) if coverage under such plan was 
as broad as allowed under Federal law, 
(IV) with respect to whom there is being paid, or who are 
eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical 
institution, to have paid with respect to them, aid or assistance 
under the appropriate State plan described in clause (i), supple-
mental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS 
§§ 1381 et seq.], or a State supplementary payment;[,] 
(V) who are in a medical institution, who meet the resource 
requirements of the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) 
or the supplemental security income program, and whose income 
does not exceed a separate income standard established by the 
State which is consistent with the limit established under section 
1903(f)(4)(C) [42 USCS § 1396b(f)(4)(Q], or 
(VI) who would be eligible under the State plan under this title 
[42 USCS~~§§ 1396 et seq.] if they were in a medical institution, 
with respect to whom there has been a determination that but 
for the provision of home or community-based services described 
in section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)] they would require the 
level of care provided in a hospital, skilled nursing facility or 
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intermediate care facility the cost of which could be reimbursed 
under the State plan, and who will receive home or community-
based services pursuant to a waiver granted by the Secretary 
under section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)]; 
(B) that the medical assistance made available to any individual 
described in subparagraph (A)— 
(i) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical 
assistance made available to any other such individual, and 
(ii) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical 
assistance made available to individuals not described in subpara-
graph (A); 
(C) that if medical assistance is included for any group of individuals 
described in section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)] who are not 
described in subparagraph (A), then— 
(i) the plan must include a description of (I) the criteria for 
determining eligibility of individuals in the group for such medical 
assistance, (II) the amount, duration, and scope of medical assis-
tance made available to individuals in the group, and (III) the 
single standard to be employed in determining income and resource 
eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be employed 
in determining such eligibility, which shall be the same methodol-
ogy which would be employed under the supplemental security 
income program in the case of groups consisting of aged Mind, or 
disabled individuals in a State in which such program is in effect, 
and which shall be the same methodology which would be em-
ployed under the appropriate State plan (described in subparagraph 
(A)(0) to which such group is most closely categorically related in 
the case of other groups; 
(ii) the plan must make available medical assistance— 
(I) to individuals under the age of 18 who (but for income and 
resources) would be eligible for medical assistance as an individ-
ual described in subparagraph (A)(i), and 
(II) to pregnant women, during the course of their pregnancy, 
who (but for income and resources) would be eligible for medical 
assistance as an individual described in subparagraph (A); 
(iii) such medical assistance must include (I) with respect to 
children under 18 and individuals entitled to institutional services, 
ambulatory services, and (II) with respect to pregnant women, 
prenatal care and delivery services; and 
(iv) if such medical assistance includes services in institutions for 
mental diseases or intermediate care facility services for the men-
tally retarded (or both) for any such group, it also must include for 
all groups covered at least the care and services listed in para-
graphs (1) through (5) and (17) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS 
§ 1396d(l)-(5), (17)] or the care and services listed in any 7 of the 
paragraphs numbered (1) through (17) of such section; and 
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(D) for the inclusion of home health services for any individual who, 
under the State plan, is entitled to skilled nursing facility services; 
except that (I) the making available of the services described in para-
graph (4), (14), or (16) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(4), (14), 
(16)] to individuals'meeting the age requirements prescribed therein shall 
not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of 
any such services, or the making available of such services of the same 
amount, duration, and scope, to individuals of any other ages, (II) the 
making available of supplementary medical insurance benefits under part 
B of title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] to individuals eligible 
therefor (either pursuant to an agreement entered into under section 
1843 [42 USCS § 1395v] or by reason of the payment of premiums 
under such title [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.] by the State agency on behalf 
of such individuals), or provision for meeting part or all of the cost of 
deductibles, cost sharing, or similar charges under part B of title XVIII 
[42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] for individuals eligible for benefits under 
such part [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.], shall not, by reason of this 
paragraph (10), require the making available of any such benefits, or the 
making available of services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to 
any other individuals, (III) the making available of medical assistance 
equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made 
available to individials described in clause (A) to any classification of 
individuals approved by the Secretary' with respect to whom there is 
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a 
medical institution, to have paid with respect to them, a State supple-
mentary payment shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the 
making available of any such assistance, or the making available of such 
assistance of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other 
individuals not described in clause (A)[,] and (IV) the imposition of a 
deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for any item or service 
furnished to an individual not eligible for the exemption under section 
1916(a)(2) or (b)(2) [42 USCS § 1396o(a)(2), (b)(2)] shall not require the 
imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for the same 
item or service furnished to an individual who is eligible for such 
exemption; 
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§ 1396a. Sute plans for medical assistance [Caution: See Other provisions notes for application of 
amendments] 
(a) Contents, [Introductory matter unchanged] 
(10) [Introductory matter unchanged] 
(A) for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(aXl)-(5). 0U 
(21)], t o -
fi) [Introductory matter unchanged] 
(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I 
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A or part E of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., Uul et seq., 
1351 et seq., or 1381 et seq., or 601 et seq. or 670 et seq.] (including individuals eligible 
under this title [42 USCS J§ 1396 et seq.] by reason of section 402(aX37), 406(h), or 473(b) 
[42 USCS § 602(aX37), 606(h), oi 673(b)], or considered by the State to be receiving such 
aid as authorized under section 482(eX6) [42 USCS § 682(e)(6)]), 
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under title 
XVI [42 USCS § 1381 ct seq.] or who are qualified severely impaired individuals (as 
defined in section 1905(q) [^ 2 USCS § 1396d(q)]), 
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or children as defined in section 1905(n) [42 USCS 
§ 1396d(n)], 
(IV) who are described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection 0X\) and whose family 
income does not exceed the minimum income level the State is required to establish under 
subsection (7X2XA)'for such a family; [,] or 
(V) who are qualified family members as defined in section 1905(m)(l) [42 USCS 
§ 1396d(mXl)] 
(VI) who are described in subparagraph (C) of subsection (7X0 and whose family income 
does not exceed the income level the State is required to establish under subsection (7X2) 
(B) for such a family, or 
(VII) who are described La subparagraph (D) of subsection (/Xl) and whose family income 
does not exceed the income level the State is required to establish under subsection (iX2) 
(Q for such a family; 
(ii) [Introductory matter undianged] 
(IHIV) [Unchanged] 
(V) who are in a medical institution for a period of not less than 30 consecutive days (with 
eligibility by reason of this subclause beginning on the first day of such period), who meet 
the resource requirements of the appropriate Sute plan described in clause (I) or the 
supplemental security income program^ and whose income does not exceed a separate 
income standard estabuslied by the State which is consistent with the limit established 
under section 1903(fX4XQ [42 USCS § 1396b(iX4XQ]. 
(VI) who would be eligibiie under the State plan under this title [42 USCS (§ 1396 et sea;] 
if they were in a medical institutioo, with respect to whom there has been a determination 
that but for the provision of home or community-based services described in subsection (c), 
(d). or (e) of section 1915 {42 USCS § 1396n(c), (d)/or (e)] they would require the level of 
care provided.in a hospital,-nursing facility or intermediate eare"fadlityTor the mentally 
retarded the cost of whidti could be reimbursed under the State plan, and who will receive 
home or community-based services pursuant to a waiver granted by the Secretary under 
section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)]. 
388 
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME 42 USCS § 1396a 
(VII) who would be eligible under the State plan under this title if they were in a medical 
institution, who are terminally ill, and who will receive hospice care pursuant to a 
voluntary election described in section \90$(o) (42 USCS § \396d(o)]; 
(VIII) who is a child described in section 1905(a)(i) [42 USCS § l396d(aX»)]— 
(aa) for whom, there is in effect an adoption assistance agreement (other than an 
agreement under part E of title IV [42 USCS §§671 et seq.]) between the State and an 
adoptive parent or parents, 
(bb) who the State agency responsible for adoption assistance has determined cannot be 
placed with adoptive ^ parents without medical assistance because such child has special 
needs for medical or rehabilitative care, and 
(cc) who was eligible for medical assistance under the State plan prior to the adoption 
assistance agreement being entered into, or who would have been eligible for medical 
assistance at such time if the eligibility standards and methodologies of the' State's 
foster care program under part E of title IV [42 USCS §§ 671 et seq.] were applied 
rather than the eligibility standards and methodologies of the State's aid to families 
with dependent children program under part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 671 et seq.]; 
(IX) who are described in subsection (7X1) and are not described in clause OXIV). clause 
(iXVI). or clause (iXVII); 
(X) who are described in subsection (mXO; or 
(XI) who receive only an optional State supplementary payment based on need and paid on 
a regular basis, equal to the difference between the individual's countable income and the 
income standard used to determine eligibility for such supplementary payment (with 
countable income being the income remaining after deductions as established by the State 
pursuant to standards that may be more restrictive than the standards for supplementary 
security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), which are available to 
all individuals in the State (but which may be based on different income standards by 
political subdivision according to cost of living differences), and which are paid by a State 
that does not have an agreement with the Secretary under section 1616 or 1634 [42 USCS 
§1382e or § 1383c]; 
(B) [Unchanged] 
(C) that if medical assistance is included for any group of individuals described in section 1905(a) 
[42 USCS § 1396d(a)] who are not described in subparagraph (A) or (E), then— 
(i) the plan must include a description of (I) the criteria for determining eligibility of 
individuals in the group for such medical assistance, (II) the amount, duration, and scope of 
medical assistance made available to individuals in the group, and (III) the single standard to 
be employed in determining income and 'resource eligibility for all such groups, and the 
methodology to b* fnnloyi-d J,. det«"-niining such eligibility, which shall be no more restrictive 
than the methodology which would be employed under the supplemental security income 
program in the case of groups consisting of aged, blind, or disabled individuals in a State in 
which such program is in effect, and which shall be no more restrictive than the methodology 
which would be employed under the appropriate State plan (described in subparagraph (A)(i)) 
to which such group is most closely categorically related in the case of other groups; 
(ii), (iii) [Unchanged] 
(iv) if such medical assistance includes services in institutions for mental diseases or in an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (or both) for any such group, it also must 
include for all groups covered at least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through 
(5) and (17) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(l)-(5), (17)] or the care and services listed in 
any 7 of the paragraphs numbered (1) through (20) of such section; 
(D) for the inclusion of home health services for any individual who, under the State plan, is 
entitled to nursing facility services; and 
(EXi) but, for making medical assistance available for medicare cost-sharing (as defined in section 
1905(pX3) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3)]) for qualified medicare beneficiaries described in section 
1905(pXl) [42 USCS § 1396d(pXO]; 
(ii) for making medical assistance available for payment of medicare cost-sharing described in 
section 1905(pX3XAXO [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3XAX0] for qualified disabled and working 
individuals described in section 1905(s) [42 USCS § I396d(s)]; 
(iii) for making medical assistance available for medicare cost sharing described in section 
1905(pX3XAXii) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3XAX»)] subject to section 1905(pX4) [42 USCS 
§ 1396d(pX4)], for individuals who would be qualified medicare beneficiaries described in 
section 1905(pXO [42 USCS § 1396d(pXO] but for the fact that their income exceeds the 
income level established by the State under section 1905(pX2) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX2)j but is 
less than 110 percent in 1993 and 1994, and 120 percent in 1995 and years thereafter of the 
official poverty line (referred to in such section) for a family of the size involved; and 
(F) at the option of a State, for making medical assistance available for COBRA premiums (as 
defined in subsection 00(2)) for qualified COBRA continuation beneficiaries described in section 
1902000) [subsec 00(1) of this section]; 
except that (I) the making available of the services described in paragraph (4), (14), or (16) of section 
1905(a) [42 USCS § i?96d(aX4). (14), (16)] to. individuals meeting the age requirements prescribed 
therein shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of any such services, 
or the making available of such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to individuals of 
any other ages, (II) the making available of supplementary medical insurance benefits under part B of 
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title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] to individuals eligible therefor (either pursuant to an 
agreement entered into under section 1S43 [42 USCS § 1395v] or by reason of the payment of 
premiums under such title [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.) by the State agency on behalf of such 
individuals), or provision for meeting pan or all of the cost of deductibles, cost sharing, or similar 
charges under pan JB of title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] for individuals eligible for benefits 
under such pan [42 USCS §§ 1395j d seq.], shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the 
making available of any such benefits, or the making available of services of the same amount, 
duration, and scope, to any other individuals, (III) the making available of medical assistance equal in 
amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made available to individuals described in 
clause (A) to any classification of individuals approved by the Secretary with respect to whom there is 
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical institution, to have 
paid with respect to themf a State supplementary payment shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), 
require the making available of any such assistance, or the making available of such assistance of the 
same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals not described in clause (A), (IV) the 
imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for any item or service furnished to an 
individual not eligible for the exemption under section 1916(aX2) or (bX2) [42 USCS § 1396o(a)(2), 
(b)(2)] shall not require the imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for the same 
item or service furnished to an individual who is eligible for such exemption, (V) the making available 
to pregnant women covered under the plan of services relating to pregnancy (including prenatal, 
delivery, and postpartum services) or to any other condition which may complicate pregnancy shall 
not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of such services, or the making 
available of such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals, provided 
such services are made available On the same amount, duration, and scope) to all pregnant women 
covered under the State plan, (VI) with respect to the making available of medical assistance for 
hospice care to terminally ill individuals who have made a voluntary election described in section 
1905(o) [42 USCS § 1396d(o)] to receive hospice care instead of medical assistance for certain other 
services, such assistance may not be made available in an amount, duration, or scope less than that 
provided under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.], and the making available of such assistance 
shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of medical assistance for 
hospice care to other individuals or the making available of medical assistance for services waived by 
such terminally ill individuals, (VII) the medical assistance made available to an individual described 
in subsection OX IXA) who is eligible for medical assistance only because of subparagraph (AXiXTV) 
or (AXliXIX) shall be limited to medical assistance for services related to pregnancy (including 
prenatal, delivery, postpartum, and family planning services) and to other conditions which may, 
complicate pregnancy, (VIII) the medical assistance made available to a qualified medicare beneficiary; 
described in section 1905(pXO [42 USCS § 1396d(pXl)] shall be limited to medical assistance-Jor 
medicare cost-sharing (described nn section 1905(p)(3) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3)]), -subject t o ; g » 
provisions of subjection (n) an? wtion 1916Tb) [42 USCS § 1396o(b)], (IX) the making available^ 
respiratory care services in accordance with subsection (eX9) shall not, by reason of this paragraph 
(10), require the making available of such services, or the making available of such services of*th<? 
same amount, duration, and scope, to any individuals not included under subsection (eX9XA)»< 
provided such services are made available (in the same amount, duration, and scope) to Jail 
individuals described in such subsection, (X) if the plan provides for any fixed durational limit on 
medical assistance for inpatient hospital services (whether or not such a limit varies by medical 
condition or diagnosis), the plan must establish exceptions to such a limit for medically necessary; 
inpatient hospital services furnished v.uh respect to individuals under one year of age in a hospital 
defined under the State plan, pursuant to section 1923(a)(lXA) [42 USCS § 1396r-4], as a dispropqg 
tionate share hospital and subparagraph (6) (relating to comparability) shall not be construed" as, 
requiring such an exception for other individuals, services, or hospitals; (XI) the making available^ 
medical assistance to cover the costs of premiums, deductibles, coinsurance, and other cost-sharing 
obligations for certain individuals for private health coverage as described in section 1906 [42 USCS 
§ 1396e] shall not, by reason of paragraph (10), require the making available of any such benefits*^ 
the making available of services of the same amount, duration, and scope of such private coverage" to. 
any other individuals^], and [(XII)](XI) "the medical assistance made available to an individual^ 
described in subsection (uXl) who is eligible for medical assistance only because of subparagraph (F). 
shall be limited to medical assistance for COBRA continuation premiums (as defined in subsection 
00(2)); 
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all 
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of 
applicants or recipients of ac,sist*nr.p unHer the plan who are not 
receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to 
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under 
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between 
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility 
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are 
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) 
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, 
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant 
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for 
aid or -assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the 
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], 
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income 
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) as would not be 
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility 
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evalua-
tion of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account 
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or 
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient 
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or 
661 
42 USCS § 1396a SOCIAL SECURITY A C T 
(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program 
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in 
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not 
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into 
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs 
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law; 
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(17) except as provided in subsections (1X3). and (mX4)[J include reasonable standards (which shall 
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under 
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I, 
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et acq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et 
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security ineome benefits are not being paid 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the 
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) provide 
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for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance whlj 
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (m the case of any 
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance l a 
the form of money payments under any plan of the Sute approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or 
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.. 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq„ 601 et seq.], or t$ 
have paid.with respect to him supplemental security income benefiu under title XVI [42 USCS 
($1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his 
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, < Q provide for reasonable evaluation of any such 
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual 
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient b such 
individual spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to States eligible to 
participate in the Sute program esublished under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] 
(with respect to Sutes which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for 
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by uking into account, except 
to the extent prescribed by the SecreUry, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums; 
payments made to the Sute under section 1903(f)(2)(B) [42 USCS § 1396b(D(2)(B)],
 0r otherwise and 
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of the Sute or 
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care 
recognized under Sute law; 
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been determined 
to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, such assistance will 
be made available to him for care and services included under the plan 
and furnished in or after the third month before the month in which he 
made application (or application was made on his behalf in the case of a 
deceased individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon 
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the time 
such care and services were furnished; 
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care in an institution, there shall be deducted from the monthly income (in addition to other 
allowances otherwise provided under the State plan) a monthly personal needs allowance— 
(i) which is reasonable in amount for clothing and other personal needs of the individual (or. 
couple) while in an institution, and 
fii) which is not less (and may be greater) than the minimum monthly personal needs 
allowance described m paragraph (2). 
(B) In this subsection, the term "institutionalized individual or couple" means an individual o£ 
married couple— 
(i) who is an inpatient (or who are inpatients) in a medical institution or nursing facility for 
which payments are made under this title throughout a month, and 
(ii) who is or are determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the State plan. 
(2) The minimum monthly personal needs allowance described in this paragraph is $30 for an 
institutionalized individual and $60 for an institutionalized couple (if both are aged, blind, or 
disabled, and their incomes are considered avjiilable to each other in determining eligibility)." 
(r) Disregarding payments for certain medical expenses by institutionalized individuals, (1) For purposes 
of sections 1902(aX17) andi924(dXlXD) [subsec. (aX17) of this section and 42 USCS § 1396r-5(dX!J 
(D)] and for purposes of a waiver'under section 1915 [42 USCS § 1396n], with respect loathe post 
eligibility treatment of income of individuals who are institutionalized or receiving -liome 
commun!ty3>as& servkes^uttdef Such a waiver shere shall be disregarded refjaration^yments^na^ 
by the Federal Republic ^ <krmanyLand1 'tbercshall be taken'into account amounts fbr^nfcnrreffl 
expenses fatJnedical or remedial care that an: "not subject to payment by a third party; including— 
(i) medicare and other health insurance premiums, deductibles, or coinsurance, and 
(ii) necessary medical or remedial care recognized under State law but not covered under the State 
plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq ], subject to reasonable limits the State may establish 
on the amount of these expenses. 
(2XA) The methodology to be employed in determining income and resource eligibility for individuals^ 
under subsection (aX10XAX»Xm). frXlOXAXOOV). (aXlOXAXiXVI), (aXlOXAXiXVII), (aXltf 
(AXu), (aXlOXCXiXin). or (0 or under section 1905(p) [1396d(p)] may be less restrictive- and' 
shall be no more restrictive, than the methodology— 
(i) in the case of groups consisting of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, under the 
suppic&ieuuu acviutcy income program under title XVI [42 USCS J§ u&i et seq.], or 
(ii) in the case of other groups, under 1 Jie State plan most closely categorically related. 
(B) For purposes of this' subsection and subsection (aXlO), methodology is considered to be "Mi 
more restrictive"-'^ using the'methodology, additional individuals may be eligible for medial 
assistance and no individuals who are otherwise eligible are made ineligible for such assistance, 
(s) Adjustment m payment for hospital service*! furnished to low-Income' cxdMrea under" the "age <iP;^  
years. In order to meet the requirements of subsection (aX55), the State plan must provide that paymen$ 
to hospitals under the\plan for inpatient hospital services furnished to infanb who have not attained ttfc 
age of 1 year, and to children who have ifcrt-attained the age of 6 years and who w«rve^su<*«nrfce«yS 
a disprc^ortk»ate; share ^mfcal described in lection 1923(bXl) (42 USCS { 1 3 9 6 r ^ X l f t * » % \ ^ S 
(1) if made od a prospective basis (whether per diem, per case, or. otherwise) provide for an otothtf 
adjustment in payment amounts for medically necessary inpatient hospital services involving excep! 
tionally high costs orjdxoeptionally long lengths of stay, 
(2) not be limited by.thVlmpositkm.of day limits with respect to the delivery of such services to socsc 
individuals, and 
(3) not be limited by the imposition of dollar limits (other than such limits resulting from pjuspccgjj 
payments as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (1)) with respect to the delivery of such services to any 
such individual who has not attained their fim birthday (or in the case of such an individual who ii 
an inpatient on his first birthday until such individual is discharged). 
(t) State tax contribatJoiL Except as provided in section 1903(i) [42 USCS § 1396b(i)], nothing in tins 
title [42 USCS Jj 1396 et seq.) (including section* 1903(a) and 1905(a) [42 USCS « 1936b(a), 1396d(a)D 
shall be construed $s authorizing the Secretary to deny or limit payments to a State for expenditures, fix 
medical assistance for items or services, attributable to taxes (whether or not of general applicability) 
imposed with respect to the provision of such items or services. 
(u) Federal assistance for payments for COBRA continuation coverage. (1) Individuals described in this 
paragraph are individualfr 
(A) who are entitled to elect COBRA continuation coverage (as defined in paragraph (3)X 
(B) whose income (as determined under section 1612 [42 USCS § 1383] for purposes of the 
supplemental security income program) d x s not exceed 100 percent of the official poverty line (as 
defined by the Office of Management and Budget, and revised annually in accordance with section 
673(2) of the Ommbus Budget Recondition Act of 1981 [42 USCS J 9902 (2)D applicable to a. 
family of the size involved,, 
( Q whose resources (as determined under section 1613 [42 USCS (1384) for purposes of the 
supplemental security income program) do not exceed twice the maximum amount of resources 
that an individual may have and obtain benefits under that program, and 
(D) with respect to whose enrollment for COBRA continuation coverage the State has determined 
that the savings in expenditures under tins title [42 USCS {§ 1396 et seq.] resulting from such 
enrollment is Hkdy to exceed the amount of payments for COBRA premiums made. 
(2) For purposes of subsection (aXlOXF) and this subsection, the term "COBRA premiums** means 
the applicable premium imposed with respect to COBRA continuation coverage. 
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ARTICLE 3 
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS 
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health 
to establish rules and regulations. 
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each 
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria (PKU) and 
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain 
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for 
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, Cross-References. — Fees for and restric-
§ 36. tion on testing, § 26-10-6. 
26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 26-17-22 (L. 1965, ch. 
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations 
of regulations relating to PKU tests, was re-
pealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162. 
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bility under Medicaid — Funds 26-18-10. 
for abortions. 
26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical 26-18-11. 
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Compliance with Social Secu-
rity Act. 
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tive director. 
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statutes — Contract with Office 
of Recovery Services. 
Prohibited acts of state or local 
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Utah Medical Assistance Pro-
gram — Policies and standards. 
Rural hospitals. 
26-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1981, 
ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to 
26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch. 
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to 
use of confidential information in research. 
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted 
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by § 17 of the act. For present provision relat-
ing to confidential information, see Chapter 25 
of this title. 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the 
medical programs of the state. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the 
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1. 
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be 
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assis-
tance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant 
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act. 
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or pay-
ments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance 
under state medical programs. 
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital 
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L. Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assis-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 11. tance Program established under Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- 26-1 ft-10" for "th* *W,*rfciriej.it hn<? determined 
ment, efifective July 1, 1988, added present to be eligible for medical of'Hospital assistance 
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Sub- under the medical programs of the state." 
sections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6), Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has re- eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
ceived medical or hospital assistance under the U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Fi-
nancing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and main-
taining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 2. makes the act efifective on July 1, 1988. 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities. 
_ The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of 
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as 
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall: 
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this 
chapter; 
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and 
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in 
compliance with federal law and regulations. 
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Peri-
odic assessment. 
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economi-
cal manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to 
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, ex-
cessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that 
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity 
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to 
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with 
regard to both publicly and privately provided services. 
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods, 
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to: 
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utili-
zation is reasonable and necessary; 
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions; 
(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropri-
ate cases; 
(d) second surgical opinions; 
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services; 
(fV^obrdinafion of benefits; and 
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who 
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures 
and provisions of federal law and regulation. 
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effective-
ness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider 
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services 
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreason-
able utilization. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 4. makes the act effective July 1, 1988. 
Social Security Act — Title XDC of the fed-
eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and 
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and proce-
dures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall 
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reim-
bursements incorrectly paid. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted fay L. regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, eh. 21, § 5. federal agency" and made various minor phra-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- seology and stylistic changes, 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2) Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
substituted "this chapter, the requirements of
 e r a i Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations" U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
for '"the requirements of Title XIX and with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Pub-
lic Welfare § 126. 
Key Numbers. — Social Security <*=» 241. 
26-18-3.5. Copayments by health service recipients, 
spouses, and parents. 
The department shall selectively provide for enrollment fees, premiums, 
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their 
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 135, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 169. 
26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medi-
caid — Funds for abortions. 
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating 
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid 
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment 
of part or all costs of care detennined to be medically necessary. 
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or 
other medical expenditures or medical services tox>therwise eligible persons 
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of 
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed., 
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(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abor-
tion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor and subject to forfeiture of office. 
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treat-
ment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty 
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine 
or authority to provide medical services and treatment. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L. minor changes in phraseology throughout the 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1987, ch. 181, § 2. section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Cross-References. — Penalties for misde-
ment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201, 
subsequent subsections accordingly and made 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services — 
Federal provisions modifying department rules 
— Compliance with Social Security Act. 
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to 
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the 
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts 
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to 
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified pro-
gram. 
(2) All contracts for the provision or purchase of medical services shall be 
established on the basis of the-State's fiscal year and shall remain uniform 
during XSt: fiscal year insofar as possible. Contract terms shall include provi 
sions for maintenance, administration, and service costs. 
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or 
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition 
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change 
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion. 
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the 
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder 
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social 
Security Act. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L. tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6. rules necessary." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Social Security Act — The federal Social 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sen- Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et 
tence of Subsection (1) substituted "division" geq. 
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director. 
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the 
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the 
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution, 
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, offered or 
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consis-
tent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used 
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for pur-
poses related to medical assistance programs. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. 
26-18-7. Medical vendor rates. 
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of 
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards 
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each 
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for 
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which funds are 
to be requested. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sen-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7. tence twice substituted "division" for "depart-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- ment." 
26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Con-
tract with Office of Recovery Services, 
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the 
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133, 
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or ad-
ministered by the division under this chapter. 
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11, 
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or adminis-
tered by the division under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment by Chapter 21, effec-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 1, § 2; 1988, ch. tive July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for 
21, § 8. "department" throughout the section. 
"""Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- This section has been reconciled by the Of-
ment by Chapter 1, effective January 19,1988, fice o f Legislative Research and General Coun-
substituted the present statutory references for 8e*-
"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through 
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c 
of Title 55" in Subsection (2). 
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of 
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor. 
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under 
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer 
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for 
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing 
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United 
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a 
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section 
208 of Title 18, United States Code. Violation of this section is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-9, enacted by L. ment by federal officers or employees in their 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. official capacity in matters in which they have 
Compiler's Notes. -— 18 U.S C §§ 207 and a personal financial interest. 
208 deal respectively with participation by for- Cross-References. — Penalty for misde-
mer federal officers or employees in matters meanora, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
involving the government and with involve-
26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies 
and standards. 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons who 
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVm of that act. 
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other non-
medical government institutions are not eligible for services provided under 
this section. 
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relat-
ing to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for pay-
ment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is ren-
dered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the 
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or ser-
vices are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method 
of payment, which may be partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospi-
tal, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible 
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an 
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion 
were not performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. § 17), relating to duties of the department, and 
1982, ch. 26, § 1; 1985, ch. 165, § 38; 1987, enacted present § 26-18-10. 
ch. 181, § 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9. Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982, ment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for 
ch. 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C. "equivalent of Viiniir in two places in Subsec-
1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, tion (6). 
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The 1987 amendment, effective July 1,1987, 
in Subsection ID, substituted "Medicare tinder 
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under 
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsec-
tion (6), which provided for relief of the obliga-
tion of counties to provide medical care to the 
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, 
substituted "division" for "department" in Sub-
sections (1) &nd (4) and in Subsection (1) in-
serted "which shall be known as the Utah Med-
ical Assi^tan^ Program." 
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
eral Social Security Act, cited in Subsection 
(1), appears as 42 ILS.C. §§ 1396 to 1396s. Ti-
tle XVIlJ of tb e act appears as 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395 0 1395ccc. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's 
Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. 
L. 1 (1988). 
26-18-11. Rural hospitals. 
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located 
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the 
United States Bureau of the Census. 
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among 
rural hospitals on the basis of size. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 12, § 1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 12, § 2 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
Section 
26-19-1. 
26-19-2. 
26-19-3. 
26-19-4. 
26-19-5. 
26-19-6. 
26-19-7. 
26-19-8. 
Section 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Program established by depart- 26-19-9 V> 
ment — Promulgation of rules. 26-19-13. 
Repealed. 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Notice — Action — 26-19-14. 
Compromise or waiver — ]Re-
cipient's right to action pro-
tected — Limit on payment for 
liability. 26-19-15. 
Action by department — Notice to 
recipient. 26-19-16. 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 26-19-17. 
— Department's right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 26-19-18. 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Statute of limitations — Survival 
of right of action — Insurance 
policy not to limit time allowed 
for recovery. 
26-19-12. Repealed. 
Recovery of medical assistance 
payments from recipient — 
Lien against estate — Recovery 
of incorrectly paid amounts. 
Insurance policies not to deny or 
reduce benefits of persons eligi-
ble for state medical assistance 
— Exemptions. 
Attorney general or county attor-
ney to represent department. 
Department s right to attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Application of provisions contrary 
to federal law prohibited 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Liability for violation. 
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CHAPTER 17 
MENTAL HEALTH 
(Repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162; 1969, ch. 197, § 187; 1971, ch. 172, § 27; 
1988, ch. 1, § 407; 1989, ch. 22, § 51.) 
26-17-1 to 26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 22, § 51 repeals 3 to 7, and 9; 1967, ch. 174, §§ 36 and 147; 
this chapter, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 54 1980, ch. 30, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, § 3; and 1981, 
and by Laws 1987, ch. 180, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, ch. 120, § 3, effective April 24, 1989. For 
§ 8; and 1967, ch.174, § 153 and as amended present comparable provisions, see Chapter 12 
by Laws 1969, ch. 197, §§ 60 and 63; 1979, ch.
 0f Title 62A. 
233, § 1; 1987, ch. 141, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, §§ 1, 
CHAPTER 18 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT 
Sunset Act- — Section 63-55-226 provides that the Medical Assistance Act is repealed July 1, 
1994. 
Section phnary measures and sanctions 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid pro- — Funds collected 
gram by department — Disci-
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
r^K&^&Sunset^AcC— Section 63-55-226 provides 
that the Division of Health Care Financing is 
repealed July 1, 1994. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions — 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The depariment shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanc-
tions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures 
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of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not 
extend beyond: 
(a) termination from the program; 
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and 
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act. 
(5) Funds collected as a result of a ssmction imposed under Section 1919 of 
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General 
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance 
with the requirements of that section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989, 
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a) 
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substi-
tuted "shall provide, by rulew for "may provide 
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not 
extend" in tbe introductory language of Sub-
section (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punc-
tuation changes throughout Subsection (4); 
and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Sub-
section (3). 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r. 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
Section 
26-19-2. 
26-19-5. 
26-19-7. 
Definitions 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Lien — Notice — Ac-
tion — Compromise or waiver 
— Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 
action 
26-19-18. 
— Department's right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Exception — Liability for viola-
tion. 
26-19-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under 
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVm and XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act. 
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal 
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest. 
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from 
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a 
recipient. 
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical 
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and 
survivors if he is deceased. 
(5) 'Third party" means: 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
iecision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
riewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
EJ87, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Timendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for'Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
*~ t, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As ceduren in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) 
ided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
 § 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
appellate court designated by statute m
 19gg 
ction (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Dftmction of district court tnct court will no longer function as intermedin 
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
aons through formaTadjudicative proceed- adjudicate* nrcceed'iig* &
 n0vo pursuant to 
will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
; or Court of Appeals Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct App 1988). 
83-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) eiyoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
«%7, ch. 161, § 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. —- Laws 1987. ch. 161, 
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under t>u| 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. 63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection :(lj(S 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, efifective April 25, 1988, delete "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 16lj 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 315
 makes the act efifective on January if 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988. 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court the district court will no longer function as in 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In iel 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. ITierefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)' 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellat^ arctJurt 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch. 
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read 
Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6), 
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
end of the fourth sentence. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made 
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted 
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third 
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional" 
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted 
"where not inconsistent with the law" follow-
ing "chief justice" and added "as consistent 
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6). 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah 
Const, Art. VHI, Sec. 2. 
Disqualification in particular case, Utah 
Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 2. 
Judicial nomination and selection, 
§ 20-1-7.1 et seq. 
Membership on state law library board, 
§ 37-1-1. 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, 
§ 78-7-21. 
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
Vm, Sec. 7. 
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 15; 
§ 49-6-101 et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30. 
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts Key 
§§ 67, 68. Judges 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A 
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Numbers. — Courts «=» 101, 248; 
*=» 1, 7 to 12. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
§ 4. 
Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
ch. ICC, IJL), relating to salaries of justices, 
was repeated by*Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into efifect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
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(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not ha ire original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of-the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by I* 
1986,.ch^47^§r41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac-
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. ' r7-' 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
section (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a) 
which read "firstdegree and capital felony con-
victions"; substituted "(0" for "(i)" at thejend of 
Subsection (4)(g), ar.J uiaJc minor scyhstic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Appeals from juve-
nile courts, § 78-3a-51. 
Appeals in criminal cases, U.R.O.P. 26. 
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35, 
20-15-14. 
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const. Art. VIII, 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Industrial commission orders, review of, 
§ 35-1-36. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 3. 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19. 
Unemployment compensation decisions, re-
view of, § 35-4-10. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
—Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas 
corpus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 PJ2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). * • 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
"but for" the conviction, he would not have 
been incarcerated in Arizona and then trans-
ferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court 
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the post-
conviction actions of the bo«rd of pardon* n»»< 
did not challenge the conviction in the trial 
court or the sentence, and the fact that defen-
dant was serving a sentence for a first-degree 
felony did not require a transfer to the Su-
preme Court under the circumstances. North-
ern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Post-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
view. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Sentence reduction. 
When a conviction is reduced under 
§ 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having 
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded m 
the judgment of conviction and for which de-
fendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of 
crime charged in the information or found in 
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 PJ2d 1168 
(Utah 1991). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall 
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 47. 
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For text of Act set p. 305 
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965) 
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965 
Senate July 9, July 28,1965 
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out. 
S E N A T E REPORT NO. 404 
HE Committee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6675) 
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social 
Security Act with a supplementary health benefits program and an ex-
panded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the Federal-
State public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having consid-
ered the same, icport favorably thereon with amendments and recommend 
that the bill do pass. 
PART I 
I. B R I E F SUMMARY 
The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows: 
First, to provide a coordinated approach i:or health insurance and medical 
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new 
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the 
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other 
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical 
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled, 
and families with dependent children. 
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled 
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year 
program of "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care 
and services for needy children (including those who are emotionally dis-
turbed) of school age or preschool age. 
« 
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6. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF KERR-MILLS 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(a) Background 
The provision of medical care for the needy has long been a responsi-
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years, 
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carry-
ing this responsibility by participating in the cost of the care provided. 
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States, 
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could 
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act 
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in be-
half of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the so-
called vendor payments. 
Several times since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions 
of law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of 
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was 
in 1960 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program 
was authorized. This legislation offers generous Federal matching to 
enable the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons who 
have enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for 
medical care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States 
and 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged 
were aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the 
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years 
until, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some 
items of medical care for at least some of the needy. 
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which 
States o^eiaie u>ru medical assictance programs so as to make medical 
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this ob-
jective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a 
new title in the Social Security Act—'Title X I X : Grants to the States 
for Medical Assistance Programs." 
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967, 
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching 
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would 
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the 
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate 
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and 
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent 
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently 
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Pro-
grams of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be 
optional with the States. 
(b) State plan requirements 
(1) Standard provisions 
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of require-
ments for State plans which are either identical to the existing provi-
sions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are: 
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State, 
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for 
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness. 
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary 
may from time to time require. 
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or 
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to pur-
poses directly connected with the administration of the plan. 
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance 
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such as-
sistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness. 
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be 
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or 
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select 
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc 
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom. 
/ 
(2) Additions to standard provisions 
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the 
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either 
new or changed over provisions currently in the law. 
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State 
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expendi-
tures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial par-
ticipation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This pro-
vision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local 
funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the amount, 
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the 
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider 
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire non-
Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives, 
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent 
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy. 
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles 
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods 
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the 
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the require-
ment that such methods must include provisions for utilization of pro-
fessional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is im-
portant that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified per-
sonnel in the administration of the program including both medical and 
other professional staff. 
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan in-
clude a description of the standards, methods, and administrative ar-
rangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in 
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no author-
ity to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect 
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is some-
what analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assist-
ance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requir-
ing States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing and maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which 
recipients may receive care or services. 
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June 
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards 
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) re-
lating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and safe-
ty of individuals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, The committee assumes that the standards pre-
scribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those pre-
scribed by the Secretary. 
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administering 
the State plan under title XIX shall be the same agency which is cur-
rently administering either title I (old-age assistance) or that part of 
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical 
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relat-
ing to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall super-
vise the administration of title XIX. 
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportun-
ity to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number 
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief 
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility 
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to 
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility 
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administer-
ing State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees 
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have 
'long experience and skill in determination of eligibility." 
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on 
the date a State submits its title XIX plan, the State agency administer-
ing or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind un-
der title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the 
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new 
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or super-
vise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which re-
lates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining 
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered 
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan. 
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agen-
cies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types 
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under 
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to 
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care 
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of 
care in many medical institutions are not now at a satisfactory level and 
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will 
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these stan-
dards will be enforced by the appropriate State body. 
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include 
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and 
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was 
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use 
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the ef-
fect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for 
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions 
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the qual-
ity of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this 
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive 
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such pro-
cedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with med-
ical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to 
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of 
services under the State plan. 
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation of all State 
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation. 
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance 
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include 
provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or as-
sistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X /XIV, and XVI. 
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical 
assistance to the less needy. 
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons 
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must not be less 
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid 
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration, 
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all 
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy 
aided under the federally aided categories of assistance. 
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs to 
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of 
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet 
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals 
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that made avail-
able for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was in-
cluded in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no 
less comprehensive care than those who-are not as needy. 
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not re-
ceiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determina-
tion of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among 
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recip-
ients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance pro-
grams. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be 
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a 
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for 
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope, 
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these 
groups must be equal. 
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this pro-
vision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in insti-
tutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participa-
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tion is authorized only with respect to recipients aged 65 and over in 
mental and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be appropriate to 
include them within the scope of this provision. 
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance 
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the 
law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the 
plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives 
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources 
which individuals may hold and be eligible Xor a*d, they must do so by 
maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy 
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be 
that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for example, 
shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the eligibil-
ity for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a comparability 
to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those who are to re-
ceive medical assistance as needy children and the parents or other rela-
tives caring for them. 
Another provision is included that requires States to take into account 
only such income and resources as (determined in accordance with stan-
dards prescribed by the Secretary), are actually available to the applicant 
or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future 
needs) in determining the eligibility for and the amount of the aid or as-
sistance in the form of money payments for any such applicant or re-
cipient under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately ap-
plicable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore, 
must be reasonably evaluated by the States. These provisions are de-
signed so that the States will not assume the availability of income which 
may nol, in fact, be available or overevaluate incc^* and resources which 
are available. Examples of income assumed include support orders from 
absent fathers, which have not been paid or contributions from relatives 
which are not in reality received by the needy individual. 
The committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals by re-
quiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed 
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to sup-
port each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their 
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled chil-
dren even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for sup-
port may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for 
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements 
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among 
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their 
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than 
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who are blind 
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made 
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account 
by the State in determining whether the individual applying for medical 
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance. 
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weak-
nesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under 
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the fi-
nancial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income 
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided un-
der the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the 
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical as-
sistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the 
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the 
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the con-
sideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the 
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical 
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or oth-
erwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligi-
ble for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be 
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both 
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the 
medical care he requires. 
This determination must be made by the agency administering the old-
age assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency. 
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the indi-
vidual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount 
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that de-
scribed below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items 
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources 
which' would bring the individual's income below the amount established 
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce 
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for 
his maintenance. 
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit 
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any 
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan. 
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with re-
spect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This pro-
vision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States 
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under 
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hos-
pital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the 
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that 
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or re-
sources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level) 
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall 
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary 
and included in the State plan. 
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a 
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the 
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income 
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment 
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital 
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this 
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources an 
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs. 
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions 
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connection 
with the individuars claim for hospitalization benefits. The committee is 
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons and 
that the necessity of their paying deductibles or cost sharing shall not be 
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving the 
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's bill provides 
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older who 
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharing 
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by the 
hospital insurance provisions of the bill. 
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in full 
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program estab-
lished by part B of title XVIII. In the event, however, the State plan pro-
-wdes for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such portion 
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's in-
come, or income and resources and in conformity with standards issued 
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—under 
~this^provision which, it is expected, will protect the income and resources 
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States, buch 
standards shall protect the income and resources of the individual needed 
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility placed 
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on them. 
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged pro-
gram now provide that the States may not impose a lien against the 
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical as-
sistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning in-
correct payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts cor-
rectly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and 
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill,, 
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would be 
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is tinder the 
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
(e) Scope and definition of medical services 
"Medical assistance" is defined under the bill to mean payment of all 
or part of the cost of care and sen-ices for individuals who would if 
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and 
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 406(b) 
(1) with whom the child is living, or who are 65 years of age and older, 
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and re-
sources are insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as 
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of med-
ical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individ-
ual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program 
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as 
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their 
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for 
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